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Abstract
Identifying and Mitigating Trust Violations
in the Mobile Ecosystem
by
Antonio Bianchi
Mobile systems, such as smartphones and tablets, are now the most common way users
handle digital information and interact with online services. The interaction with these
devices encompasses different actors, trusting each other in different ways. Users interact
with apps, trusting them to access valuable and privacy-sensitive information. At the
same time, apps usually communicate with remote backends and mediate user authenti-
cation to online services. Finally, all these interactions are mediated, on one side, by the
user interface and, on the other, by the operating system.
In this thesis, I will present my studies on how all these different actors trust each
other and how this trust can be unfortunately violated by attackers. This is possible due
to limitations on how the operating system, apps, and the user interface are currently
designed and implemented. To assist my work, I developed automatic analysis tools to
perform large-scale analyses of Android apps. In this thesis, I will describe both the tools
I have developed and my findings.
Specifically, I will first describe my work on how, in an Android system, it is possible
to lure users to interact with malicious apps which “look like” legitimate ones. This
completely violates the trust relationship, mediated by the user interface, between users
and apps. As a countermeasure, I implemented modifications of the Android user inter-
face and evaluated their effectiveness with a user study. Then, I will explain how many
apps unsafely authenticate their users to remote backends, due to misplaced trust in
vii
the operating system. In particular, I identified different apps that only rely on values
provided by the operating system to perform authentication. For this reason, an attacker
can trivially spoof these values, and logins in behalf of a legitimate user. Finally, I will
show how many apps misuse hardware-backed authentication devices, such as trusted
execution environments and fingerprint readers, making them vulnerable to a variety of
authentication bypass attacks
viii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Mobile systems, such as smartphones and tablets, have become part of the everyday life
of billions of people. Given the ability of these devices to continuously collect potentially-
private information from the environment around them, and the fact that users trust them
to perform an increasing amount of sensitive tasks, in an ideal world, the software they
run should be free from security issues. However, the complexity of these devices and of
the ecosystem revolving around them (which is composed of millions of apps, application
markets, different manufacturers, and multiple vendors) hinders the developers’ ability
to safely implement functionalities. The goal of my research has been to study the new
security issues introduced by the mobile ecosystem, showing how they can be exploited
by attackers and implementing solutions for these problems.
As an introductory example, consider a user using an app on a mobile device to
transfer money. This simple and common use case hides several challenges that my
research has unveiled and addressed: How can the user be sure that they are interacting
with the legitimate mobile banking app (and not with a look-alike malicious application)?
How can the app authenticate the user to the remote banking backend? Is password-
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based authentication sufficient? What are the alternatives to improve both usability and
security? Can authentication and authorization be implemented securely, even when a
device is in a non-secure state (e.g., the operating system is compromised)?
All these questions correspond to currently open problems in the field of Mobile Sys-
tem Security. As a result, smartphones are exploited every day by attackers, causing
privacy violations, monetary loss, and even property loss when, for instance, a smart-
phone is used to control a house’s lock.
In this section, first I will introduce the lines of research I followed and my general
approach. Then, I will briefly present the three projects that form the main body of this
thesis.
1.1 Lines of Research and Approach
In this thesis work, I followed two complementary lines of research:
• Understanding the trust relationships in the mobile ecosystem: Mobile
systems involve different actors, such as users, user-interfaces, apps, devices, hard-
ware, remote backends, and hardware manufacturers. Understanding how they
interact is crucial to evaluate the security of a mobile system.
• Developing scalable automated analyses: To evaluate the security of mobile
systems rigorously and at scale, a combination of static and dynamic automated
analyses is necessary. Existing techniques need to be adapted to work in the mobile
ecosystem.
2
Introduction Chapter 1
Chapter 2:
User/User-Interface Trust Relationship
Chapter 4:
Hardware-Assisted Authentication
Chapter 3:
Trusting the Operating System for
Remote Authentication
Figure 1.1: A summary of the different mobile ecosystem’s components studied in this thesis.
1.1.1 Understanding the Trust Relationships in the Mobile
Ecosystem
The interaction with mobile systems encompasses different actors, trusting each other
in different ways. First of all, we have users, interacting with apps and trusting them
to access valuable and privacy-sensitive information. At the same time, apps usually
communicate with remote backends and mediate user authentication to online services.
Finally, all these interactions are mediated on one side by the user interface and on the
other by the operating system.
If any of these components is compromised the entire “chain-of-trust” is violated.
For instance, consider the case in which a user wants to use a mobile banking app. If
an attacker can compromise the device’s user interface (for instance, luring the user to
insert her credentials in an attacker-controlled app, instead of the legitimate one) the
3
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entire authentication schema is defeated, regardless of how well its other components are
implemented. Likewise, if the application stores an authentication token in a publicly
readable location, the authentication schema can be violated by an attacker able to install
a malicious app on the victim’s device.
Figure 1.1 presents an overview of the different components in the mobile ecosystem
studied by this thesis and their relationships. On the top, we have users interacting with
apps. The user interface mediates this interaction. How this interaction is carried out
and how attackers can compromise it will be the topic of Chapter 2. On the left, we
have remote backends. In fact, most of the apps continuously communicate with remote
backends and implement some form of authentication between their users and their re-
mote backends. The way in which an attacker can exploit some of the authentication
schemas used by these apps, which are vulnerable because they use untrusted informa-
tion to perform authentication, will be the topic of Chapter 3. Finally, on the right, the
figure shows Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), which, in modern devices, can be
used to implement safer and more usable authentication schemas. The way in which apps
use (often incorrectly) TEEs and weaknesses in their current design will be the topic of
Chapter 4.
1.1.2 Developing Scalable Automated Analyses
The sheer amount of applications available for mobile systems and the complexity
of these applications rule out manual analysis to carry on any comprehensive security
analysis. For this reason, throughout my research I have developed tools, based both on
static and dynamic analysis, to automatically study security issues at scale.
4
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These tools are not only useful for security researchers, but also for developers to
identify vulnerabilities in their apps, and for application market operators to vet submit-
ted applications for both vulnerabilities and malicious code. In fact, automated analysis
of mobile apps is in itself an open research problem, since the mobile environment poses
significant challenges to this task. All the three works I will present in this thesis required
the creation of automated analysis tools, which will be described in details throughout
this thesis.
1.1.3 Approach
Each of the three main works presented in this thesis has been carried out by using
the following three-step approach:
1. First, I identified a component, within the mobile ecosystem, which is vulnerable
to different types of attackers, and I systematically studied its attack surface.
2. Then, I performed large-scale, automated, studies to characterize the presence of
the previously identified problems in real-world applications.
3. Finally, I proposed and implemented mitigations to the identified security issues.
5
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The following thesis statement summarizes my motivations, approach, and results:
In the mobile ecosystem, different components trust each other. The con-
sequences of these trust relationships are not well understood by both apps’
developers and operating systems’ designers.
To solve this issue, first, we need to systematically study the attack surfaces
of the different components trusting each other. Then, we need to perform
automated large-scale studies to identify both benign apps, misplacing trust
in untrusted components, and malicious apps, exploiting weaknesses in the
ecosystem. Finally, we need to fix these weaknesses by better designing, im-
plementing, and documenting these components.
6
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1.2 Summary of the Main Contributions
In this thesis, I will present three main works. This section gives an overview of these
works and their the main contributions. Table 1.1 summarizes their contributions with
respect to the aforementioned three-step approach.
1.2.1 User/User-Interface Trust Relationship
Users are the final consumers of any operation carried on by a mobile device, and user
interfaces mediate all the interactions between users and their devices. This observation
motivated me to start my research on mobile security by focusing on the implementation
of these user interfaces. In particular, I studied how it is possible, in the Android op-
erating system, to lure users in interacting with malicious apps that look like legitimate
ones. Specifically, an attacker who is able to install a malicious app on a user’s device,
can wait for the user to open any app requiring a login (e.g., the popular “Facebook”
app) and cover the app’s legitimate login interface with an attacker-controlled one, which
leaks the inserted credentials to the attacker.
As part of this research project, I first systematically identified all the ways in which
it is possible to perform this kind of attack. Due to the complexity of the Android user
interface (UI) API and inadequacy in the Android documentation, even conceptually
simple questions, such as “How can an attacker draw content on top of a legitimate
app?”, do not have an easy answer. Therefore, the systematization of the behavior of the
Android UI required the development of automated dynamic analysis tools exploring the
entire UI API’s parameter space, looking for combinations of API calls and parameters
allowing attackers to achieve their nefarious goals.
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Afterward, I developed a static analysis system to detect malicious apps exploiting
this issue. This system was able to automatically detect applications that interfered with
the Android UI. As an example, one detected sample presented to the user a malicious
interface asking for credit card information, mimicking the legitimate UI normally shown
by the official Google Play Store.
Finally, I designed and implemented modifications to the Android UI to inform the
users about the origin of the apps they are interacting with (e.g., the legitimate PayPal
app is developed by “PayPal, Inc.”). To evaluate this on-device defense mechanism,
I performed a user-study involving hundreds of users. The results of this study showed
that, while in a standalone system is trivial for an attacker to lure users to interact
with a “spoofed” login interface, when the developed defense mechanism is in place, the
majority of the users can detect when they are attacked.
1.2.2 Trusting the Operating System for Authentication
After addressing issues in the UI of mobile devices, I focused on analyzing how An-
droid applications authenticate users while interacting with remote backends.
In particular, I was able to identify a class of authentication mechanisms which are
intrinsically insecure. These authentication schemes are based on what I define as device-
public information, which consists of properties and data that any application running on
a device can obtain, such as the device’s identifiers, files in publicly accessible locations,
and the content of received text messages. While these schemes are convenient to users
(since they require little or no interaction to perform authentication), they are vulnerable
by design, because all the needed information to authenticate a user is available to any
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app installed on a device. An attacker with a malicious app on a user’s device could
easily hijack the user’s account, steal private information, send (and receive) messages
on behalf of the user, or steal valuable virtual goods.
To understand how widespread this class of vulnerability is and to help developers and
application market operators identify vulnerable apps, I developed a dynamic analysis
system that aims to uncover apps affected by this problem. The developed system records
the app’s UI behavior during its first execution on a device, when authentication is
likely to happen. Then, as a second step, the system wipes the app’s private data and
runs the app again, still recording its UI behavior. The key intuition is that if the
UI behavior of an app changes after its re-installation, it means the app may rely on
device-public information for authentication and is very likely to be vulnerable to this
attack. This is due to the fact that re-installation deletes all the private data of an app.
Therefore, if the user is still authenticated, it means that the authentication procedure
must leverage device-public information. As a final step, the system attempts to confirm
the vulnerability by exploiting it to login on behalf of the legitimate user from a different,
attacker-controlled device, on which the device-public information present in the victim’s
device has been cloned.
I used this analysis system to vet 1,000 of the most popular applications from the
Google Play Store, and found that 41 of them were vulnerable to this attack. Two of
these vulnerable apps were WhatsApp and Viber, two of the most popular messaging
apps, with hundreds of millions of installations. For both these apps, I discovered that
it was sufficient to steal the content of a publicly accessible file (and spoof the value of
some device’s identifiers) to fully hijack a user account. I reported these findings to the
respective security teams, which quickly acknowledged the problems and addressed the
vulnerabilities.
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1.2.3 Hardware-Assisted Authentication
Application developers strive to create authentication mechanisms that, unlike user-
names and passwords, require minimal user interaction. Unfortunately, this can lead to
unsafe authentication schemes, as the ones I mentioned before. Recently, new technolo-
gies have been developed to support authentication and authorization schemes that are
both more usable and more secure than traditional username and password authentica-
tion.
In particular, most smartphones come with Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs)
that can be used to generate and store cryptographic keys. Furthermore, TEEs can be
programmed to directly communicate with a fingerprint reader sensor (which is widely
available on modern smartphones). In this way, it is possible to build systems in which
non-exportable, safely-stored cryptographic keys are only usable when the fingerprint
reader detects a registered legitimate fingerprint, signaling the user’s explicit consent to
perform a specific security-sensitive operation, such as transferring money. Since a TEE is
a hardware-enforced isolated execution environment, the keys it stores and the operations
performed with those keys cannot be leaked or misused even if the smartphone’s operating
system is compromised. In addition, even if a device is stolen, an attacker cannot misuse
the keys stored on it without the owner’s fingerprint.
The combination of these factors allows, at least in theory, to implement authenti-
cation and authorization systems that provide strong security guarantees, even against
powerful attackers who are able to compromise the operating system of a device. How-
ever, the reality is very different due to both the way in which most of the apps use the
fingerprint API in Android and some weaknesses in its implementation.
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To understand how developers use in practice this functionality, I performed the
first systematic study on the usage of the fingerprint API in Android. This study was
enabled by a static-analysis-based tool which I developed. The results are worrisome. For
example, the tool identified that 53.69% of the 501 analyzed apps, including the widely
deployed Google Play Store app, do not make use of the cryptographic keystore, unlocked
by a legitimate fingerprint touch. As a consequence, an attacker having root privileges
can completely bypass the fingerprint security mechanism simply by programmatically
“simulating” the user’s touch. Moreover, the current implementation of this API does
not allow users to understand what they are authorizing by touching the fingerprint
reader sensor. Therefore, an attacker can show an interface asking the user to touch
the sensor to, for instance, “Transfer 100 dollars to Friend A,” while, in reality, the
user is authorizing the operation “Transfer 100 dollars to Attacker.” To address this
issue, I proposed modifications to the implementation of the Android fingerprint API and
provided recommendations on how this API, and its documentation, should be improved
to increase the number of developers using it correctly.
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1.3 Permissions and Attributions
The content of Chapter 2 is the result of a collaboration with Jacopo Corbetta, Luca
Invernizzi, Yanick Fratantonio, Christopher Kruegel, and Giovanni Vigna, and part of a
previously published paper [1].
The content of Chapter 3 is the result of a collaboration with Eric Gustafson, Yanick
Fratantonio, Christopher Kruegel, and Giovanni Vigna, and part of a previously pub-
lished paper [2].
The content of Chapter 4 is the result of a collaboration with Yanick Fratantonio,
Aravind Machiry, Christopher Kruegel, Giovanni Vigna, Simon Chung, and Wenke Lee,
and part of a previously published paper [3].
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User/User-Interface Trust
Relationship
Today, smartphone and tablet usage is on the rise, becoming the primary way of accessing
digital media in the US [4]. Many users now trust their mobile devices to perform tasks,
such as mobile banking or shopping, through mobile applications, typically called “apps.”
This wealth of confidential data has not gone unnoticed by cybercriminals: over the last
few years, mobile malware has grown at an alarming rate [5].
Popular mobile operating systems run multiple apps concurrently. For example, a
user can run both her mobile banking application and a new game she is checking out.
Obviously, a game should not receive financial information. As a consequence, the ability
to tell the two apps apart is crucial. At the same time, it is important for these apps
to have user-friendly interfaces that make the most of the limited space and interaction
possibilities.
Let us assume that a victim user is playing the game, which is malicious. When this
user switches to another app, the game will remain active in the background (to support
background processing and event notifications). However, it will also silently wait for the
14
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user to login into her bank. When the malicious game detects that the user activates
the banking app, it changes its own appearance to mimic the bank’s user interface and
instantly “steals the focus” to become the target with which the victim interacts. The
user is oblivious to this switch of apps in the foreground, because she recognizes the
graphical user interface (GUI) of the banking application. In fact, there have been no
changes on the user’s display throughout the attack at all, so it is impossible for her
to detect it: she will then insert her personal banking credentials, which will then be
collected by the author of the malicious app.
In the work presented in this chapter, we study this and a variety of other GUI
confusion attacks. With this term, we denote attacks that exploit the user’s inability to
verify which app is, at any moment, drawing on the screen and receiving user inputs.
GUI confusion attacks are similar to social engineering attacks such as phishing and
click-jacking. As such, they are not fundamentally novel. However, we find that the
combination of powerful app APIs and a limited user interface make these attacks much
harder to detect on Android devices than their “cousins” launched on desktop machines,
typically against web browsers.
The importance of GUI-related attacks on Android has been pointed out by several
publications in the past, such as [6, 7] (with a focus on “tapjacking”), [8] (with a focus
on phishing attacks deriving from control transfers), and [9] (with a focus on state disclo-
sure through shared-memory counters). Our work generalizes these previously-discovered
techniques by systematizing existing exploits. Furthermore, we introduce a number of
novel attacks. As an extreme example of a novel attack, we found that a malicious app
has the ability to create a complete virtual environment that acts as a full Android in-
terface, with complete control of all user interactions and inputs. This makes it very
hard for a victim user to escape the grip of such a malicious application. Even though at
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the time of this writing the number of known samples performing GUI confusion attacks
is limited, we believe that this is a real, currently unsolved, problem in the Android
ecosystem.
This work also introduces two novel approaches to defend against GUI confusion
attacks. The first approach leverages static code analysis to automatically find apps that
could abuse Android APIs for GUI confusion attacks. We envision that this defense could
be deployed at the market level, identifying suspicious apps before they hit the users.
Interestingly, we detected that many benign apps are using potentially-dangerous APIs,
thus ruling out simple API modifications as a defense mechanism.
Our static analysis approach is effective in identifying potentially-malicious apps.
More precisely, our technique detects apps that interfere with the UI in response to some
action taken by the user (or another app). The apps that we detect in this fashion
fulfill two necessary preconditions of GUI confusion attacks: They monitor the user and
other apps, and they interfere with the UI (e.g., by stealing the focus and occupying the
top position on the screen). However, these two conditions are not sufficient for GUI
confusion attacks. It is possible that legitimate apps monitor other apps and interfere
with the UI. As an example, consider an “app-locker” program, which restricts access
to certain parts of the phone (and other apps). When looking at the code, both types
of programs (that is, malicious apps that launch GUI confusion attacks as well as app-
lockers) look very similar and make use of the same Android APIs. The difference is in
the intention of the apps, as well as the content they display to users. Malicious apps
will attempt to mimic legitimate programs to entice the user to enter sensitive data.
App-lockers, on the other hand, will display a screen that allows a user to enter a PIN or
a password to unlock the phone. These semantic differences are a fundamental limitation
for detection approaches that are purely code-based.
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Figure 2.1: Comparison between how SSL Extended Validation information is shown
in a modern Browser (Chrome 33) and what our implemented defense mechanism
shows on the navigation bar of an Android device.
To address the limitations of code-based detection, we devised a second, on-device
defense. This approach relies on modifications to the Android UI to display a trusted
indicator that allows users to determine which app and developer they are interacting
with, attempting to reuse security habits and training users might already have. To this
end, we designed a solution (exemplified in Figure 2.1) that follows two well-accepted
paradigms in web security:
• the Extended Validation SSL/TLS certification and visualization (the current-best-
practice solution used by critical businesses to be safely identified by their users)
• the use of a “secure-image” to established a shared secret between the user interface
and the user (similarly to what is currently used in different websites [10], [11] and
recently proposed for the Android keyboard [12])
We evaluate the effectiveness of our solution with a user study involving 308 human
subjects. We provided users with a system that implements several of our proposed
defense modifications, and verified that the success ratio of the (normally invisible) de-
ception attacks significantly decreases.
To summarize, the main contributions of this work are:
17
User/User-Interface Trust Relationship Chapter 2
• We systematically study and categorize the different techniques an attacker can
use to mount GUI deception attacks. We describe several new attack vectors that
we found, and we introduce a tool to automatically explore reachable GUI states
and identify the ones that can be used to mount an attack. This tool was able to
automatically find two vulnerabilities in the Android framework that allow an app
to gain full control of a device’s UI.
• We study, using static analysis, how benign apps legitimately use API calls that
render these attacks possible. Then, we develop a detection tool that can identify
their malicious usage, so that suspicious apps can be detected at the market level.
• We propose an on-device defense that allows users to securely identify authors of
the apps with which they interact. We compare our solution with the current
state of the art, and we show that our solution has the highest coverage of possible
attacks.
• In a user study with 308 subjects, we evaluate the effectiveness of these attack
techniques, and show that our on-device defense helps users in identifying attacks.
For the source code of the proof-of-concept attacks we developed and the prototype
of the proposed on-device defense, refer to our repository1.
2.1 Background
To understand the attack and defense possibilities in the Android platform, it is
necessary to introduce a few concepts and terms.
1https://github.com/ucsb-seclab/android ui deception
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The Android platform is based on the Linux operating system and it has been designed
mainly for touchscreen mobile devices. Unless otherwise noted, in this work we will
mainly focus on Android version 4.4. When relevant, we will also explain new features
and differences introduced by Android 5.0 (the latest available version at the time of
writing).
In an Android device, apps are normally pre-installed or downloaded from the Google
Play Store or from another manufacturer-managed market, although manual oﬄine in-
stallation and unofficial markets can also be used. Typically, each app runs isolated from
others except for well-defined communication channels.
Every app is contained in an apk file. The content of this file is signed to guarantee
that the app has not been tampered with and that it is coming from the developer that
owns the corresponding private key. There is no central authority, however, to ensure
that the information contained in the developer’s signing certificate is indeed accurate.
Once installed on a device, an app is identified by its package name. It is not possible to
install apps with the same package name at the same time on a single device.
Apps are composed of different developer-defined components. Specifically, four
types of components exist in Android: Activity, Service, Broadcast Receiver, and Con-
tent Provider. An Activity defines a graphical user interface and its interactions with
user’s actions. Differently, a Service is a component running in background, performing
long-running operations. A Broadcast Receiver is a component that responds to specific
system-wide messages. Finally, a Content Provider is used to manage data shared with
other components (either within the same app or with external ones).
To perform sensitive operations (e.g., tasks that can cost money or access private user
data), apps need specific permissions. All the permissions requested by a non-system app
must be approved by the user during the app’s installation: a user can either grant all
requested permissions or abort the installation. Some operations require permissions
19
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Toast
Status Bar
Top
Activity
Navigation
Bar
Figure 2.2: Typical Android user interface appearance. The status bar is at the top
of the screen, while the navigation bar occupies the bottom. A browser app is open,
and its main Activity is shown in the remaining space.
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that are only granted to system apps (typically pre-installed or manufacturer-signed).
Required permissions, together with other properties (such as the package name and the
list of the app’s components), are defined in a manifest file (AndroidManifest.xml),
stored in the app’s apk file.
2.1.1 Android graphical elements
Figure 2.2 shows the typical appearance of the Android user interface on a smart-
phone. The small status bar, at the top, shows information about the device’s state,
such as the current network connectivity status or the battery level. At the bottom,
the navigation bar shows three big buttons that allow the user to “navigate” among all
currently running apps as well as within the focused app.
Details may vary depending on the manufacturer (some devices merge the status
and navigation bars, for instance, and legacy devices may use hardware buttons for the
navigation bar). In this work we will use as reference the current guidelines2, as they
represent a typical modern implementation; in general, our considerations can be adapted
to any Android device with minor modifications.
Apps draw graphical elements by instantiating system-provided components: Views,
Windows, and Activities.
Views. A View is the basic UI building block in Android. Buttons, text fields,
images, and OpenGL viewports are all examples of views. A collection of Views is itself
a View, enabling hierarchical layouts.
2http://developer.android.com/design/handhelds/index.html,
http://developer.android.com/design/patterns/compatibility.html
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Activities. An Activity can be described as a controller in a Model-View-Controller
pattern. An Activity is usually associated with a View (for the graphical layout) and
defines actions that happen when the View elements are activated (e.g., a button gets
clicked).
Activities are organized in a global stack that is managed by the ActivityManager
system Service. The Activity on top of the stack is shown to the user. We will call this
the top Activity and the app controlling it the top app.
Activities are added and removed from the Activity stack in many situations. Each
app can reorder the ones it owns, but separate permissions are required for global mon-
itoring or manipulation. Users can request an Activity switch using the navigation bar
buttons:
• The Back button (bottom left in Figure 2.2) removes the top Activity from the
top of the stack, so that the one below is displayed. This default behavior can be
overridden by the top Activity.
• The Home button lets the user return to the base “home” screen, usually managed
by a system app. A normal app can only replace the home screen if the user
specifically allows this.
• The Recent button (bottom right in Figure 2.2) shows the list of top Activities of the
running apps, so the user can switch among them. Activities have the option not to
be listed. In Android 5.0, applications can also decide to show different thumbnails
on the Recent menu (for instance, a browser can show a different thumbnail in the
Recent menu for each opened tab).
Windows. A Window is a lower-level concept: a virtual surface where graphical
content is drawn as defined by the contained Views. In Figure 2.2, the Status Bar, the
Navigation Bar and the top Activity are all drawn in separate Windows. Normally, apps
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do not explicitly create Windows; they just define and open Activities (which in turn
define Views), and the content of the top Activity is drawn in the system-managed top-
activity Window. Windows are normally managed automatically by the WindowManager
system Service, although apps can also explicitly create Windows, as we will show later.
2.2 GUI confusion attacks
In this section, we discuss classes of GUI confusion attacks that allow for launching
stealthy and effective phishing-style or click-jacking-style operations.
In our threat model, a malicious app is running on the victim’s Android device, and
it can only use APIs that are available to any benign non-system app. We will indicate
when attacks require particular permissions. We also assume that the base Android
operating system is not compromised, forming a Trusted Computing Base.
We have identified several Android functionalities (Attack Vectors, categorized in
Table 2.1) that a malicious app can use to mount GUI confusion attacks. We have
also identified Enhancing Techniques : abilities (such as monitoring other apps) that do
not present a GUI security risk in themselves, but can assist in making attacks more
convincing or stealthier.
2.2.1 Attack vectors
Draw on top
Attacks in this category aim to draw graphical elements over other apps. Typically,
this is done by adding graphical elements in a Window placed over the top Activity. The
Activity itself is not replaced, but malware can cover it either completely or partially
and change the interpretation the user will give to certain elements.
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Table 2.1: Attack vectors and enhancing techniques. We indicate with a dash attacks
and techniques that, to the best of our knowledge, have not been already mentioned
as useful in GUI confusion attacks.
Category Attack vector Mentioned in
Draw on top
UI-intercepting draw-over [6, 8]
Non-UI-intercepting draw-over [6], [7], [8]
Toast message [6], [13]
App switch
startActivity API [9]
Screen pinning —
moveTaskTo APIs —
killBackgroundProcesses API —
Back / power button (passive) —
Sit and wait (passive) —
Fullscreen
non-“immersive” fullscreen —
“immersive” fullscreen —
“inescapable” fullscreen —
Enhancing
tech-
niques
getRunningTask API [8]
Reading the system log [14]
Accessing proc file system [15, 9]
App repackaging [16], [17], [18]
Apps can explicitly open new Windows and draw content in them using the addView
API exposed by the WindowManager Service. This API accepts several flags that de-
termine how the new Window is shown (for a complete description, refer to the original
documentation3). In particular, flags influence three different aspects of a Window:
• Whether it is intercepting user input or is letting it “pass through” to underlying
Windows.
3http://developer.android.com/reference/android/view/WindowManager.LayoutParams.
html
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• Its type, which determines the Window’s Z-order with respect to others.
• The region of the screen where it is drawn.
Non-system apps cannot open Windows of some types, while Windows with a higher
Z-order than the top-activity Window require the SYSTEM ALERT WINDOW permis-
sion.
Windows used to display toasts, text messages shown for a limited amount of time, are
an interesting exception. Intended to show small text messages even when unrelated apps
control the main visualization, toast messages are usually created with specific APIs and
placed by the system in Windows of type TOAST, drawn over the top-activity Window.
No specific permission is necessary to show toast messages. Their malicious usage has
been presented by previous research (refer to Table 2.1).
Two other types of attack are possible:
• UI-intercepting draw-over: A Window spawned using, for instance, the PRIOR-
ITY PHONE flag can not only overlay the top-activity Window with arbitrary
content, but also directly steal information by intercepting user input.
• Non UI-intercepting draw-over: By forwarding all user input to the underlying
Windows, classical “click-jacking” attacks are possible. In these attacks, users are
lured to perform an unwanted action while thinking they are interacting with a
different element.
App switch
Attacks that belong to this category aim to steal focus from the top app. This is
achieved when the malicious app seizes the top Activity: that is, the malicious app
replaces the legitimate top Activity with one of its own. The malicious app that we
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developed for our user study (Section 3.4) uses an attack in this category: it waits until
the genuine Facebook app is the top app, and then triggers an app switch and changes
its appearance to mimic the GUI of the original Facebook app.
Replacing the currently running app requires an active app switch. Passive app
switches are also possible: in this case, the malicious application does not actively change
the Activity stack, nor it shows new Windows, but it waits for specific user’s input.
We have identified several attack vectors in this category:
startActivity API. New Activities are opened using the startActivity API. Nor-
mally, the newly opened Activity does not appear on top of Activities of other apps.
However, under particular conditions the spawned Activity will be drawn on top of all
the existing ones (even if belonging to different apps) without requiring any permission.
Three different aspects determine this behavior: the type of the Android component from
which the startActivity API is called, the launchMode attribute of the opened Activity,
and flags set when startActivity is called.
Given the thousands of different combinations influencing this behavior and the fact
that the official documentation4 does not state clearly when a newly Activity will be
placed on top of other apps’ Activities, we decided to develop a tool to systematically
explore the conditions under which this happens.
Our tool determined that opening an Activity from a Service, a Broadcast Receiver, or
a Content Provider will always place it on top of all the others, as long as the NEW TASK
flag is specified when the startActivity API is called. Alternatively, opening an Activity
from another one will place the opened Activity on top of all the others if the sin-
gleInstance launch mode is specified. In addition, our tool found other, less common,
situations in which an Activity is placed on top of all the others. For more details and a
description of our tool, refer to Section 2.3.1.
4http://developer.android.com/guide/components/tasks-and-back-stack.html
26
User/User-Interface Trust Relationship Chapter 2
moveTaskTo APIs. Any app with the REORDER TASKS permission can use
the moveTaskToFront API to place Activities on top of the stack. We also found another
API, moveTaskToBack, requiring the same permission, to remove another app from the
top of the Activity stack.
Screen pinning. Android 5.0 introduces a new feature called “screen pinning” that
locks the user interaction to a specific app. Specifically, while the screen is “pinned,”
there cannot be any switch to a different application (the Home button, the Recent
button, and the status bar are hidden). Screen pinning can be either manually enabled
by a user or programmatically requested by an app. In the latter case, user confirmation
is necessary, unless the app is registered as a “device admin” (which, again, requires
specific user confirmation).
killBackgroundProcesses API. This API (requiring the
KILL BACKGROUND PROCESSES permission) allows killing the processes spawned
by another app. It can be used maliciously to interfere with how benign apps work:
besides mimicking their interface, a malicious app could also prevent them from
interacting with the user. Android does not allow killing the app controlling the top
Activity, but other attack vectors can be used to first remove it from the top of the
stack.
Back/Power Button. A malicious app can also make the user believe that an
app switch has happened when, in fact, it has not. For example, an app can intercept
the actions associated with the back button. When the user presses the back button, she
expects one of two things: either the current app terminates, or the previous Activity
on the stack is shown. A malicious app could change its GUI to mimic its target (such
as a login page) in response to the user pressing the back button, while at the same
time disabling the normal functionality of the back button. This might make the user
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believe that an app switch has occurred, when, in fact, she is still interacting with the
malicious app. A similar attack can be mounted when the user turns off the screen while
the malicious app is the top app.
Sit and Wait. When a malicious app is in the background, it can change its GUI to
that of a victim app, so that when the user switches between apps looking, for example,
for the legitimate banking application, she could inadvertently switch to the malicious
version instead. This type of attack is known in the browser world as tabnabbing [19].
Fullscreen
Android apps have the possibility to enter the so called fullscreen mode, through which
they can draw on the device’s entire screen area, including the area where the navigation
bar is usually drawn. Without proper mitigations, this ability could be exploited by
malicious apps, for example, to create a fake home screen including a fake status bar and
a fake navigation bar. The malicious app would therefore give the user the impression
she is interacting with the OS, whereas her inputs are still intercepted by the malicious
app.
Android implements specific mitigations against this threat [20]: An app can draw
an Activity on the entire screen, but in principle users always have an easy way to close
it and switch to another app. Specifically, in Android versions up to 4.3, the navigation
bar appears on top of a fullscreen Activity as soon as the user clicks on the device screen.
Android 4.4 introduces a new “immersive” fullscreen mode in which an Activity remains
in fullscreen mode during all interactions: in this case, the navigation bar is accessed by
performing a specific “swipe” gesture.
Given the large number of possible combinations of flags that apps are allowed to use
to determine the appearance of a Window in Android, these safety functionalities are
intrinsically difficult to implement. In fact, the implementation of the Android APIs in
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charge of the creation and display of Windows has thousands of lines of code, and bugs
in this APIs are likely to enable GUI confusion attacks. Therefore, we used our API
exploration tool to check if it is possible to create a Window that covers the entire device’s
screen area (including the navigation bar) without giving any possibility to the user to
close it or to switch to another application. We call a Window with these properties an
“inescapable” fullscreen Window.
Our tool works by spawning Windows with varying input values of GUI-related APIs
and, after each invocation, determines whether an “inescapable” fullscreen mode is en-
tered. By using it, several such combinations were found, thus leading to the discovery
of vulnerabilities in different Android versions. Upon manual investigation, we found
that Google committed a patch5 to fix a bug present in Android 4.3; however, our tool
pointed out that this fix does not cover all possible cases. In fact, we found a similar
problem that affects Android versions 4.4 and 5.0. We notified Google’s Security Team:
a review is in progress at the time of this writing.
Section 2.3.2 presents more technical details about the tool we developed and its
findings.
There is effectively no limit to what a malicious programmer can achieve using an
“inescapable” fullscreen app. For instance, one can create a full “fake” environment that
retains full control (and observation powers) while giving the illusion of interacting with
a regular device (either by “proxying” app Windows or by relaying the entire I/O to and
from a separate physical device).
2.2.2 Enhancing techniques
Additional techniques can be used in conjunction with the aforementioned attack
vectors to mount more effective attacks.
5https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/b816bed
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Techniques to detect how the user is currently interacting with the system
To use the described attack vectors more effectively, it is useful for an attacker to
know how the user is currently interacting with the device.
For instance, suppose again that a malicious app wants to steal bank account creden-
tials. The most effective way would be to wait until the user actually opens the specific
login Activity in the original app and, immediately after, cover it with a fake one. To do
so, it is necessary to know which Activity and which app the user is currently interacting
with.
We have identified a number of ways to do so: some of them have been disabled
in newer Android versions, but others can still be used in the latest available Android
version.
Reading the system log. Android implements a system log where standard apps,
as well as system Services, write logging and debugging information. This log is readable
by any app having the relatively-common READ LOGS permission (see Table 2.4 in the
next section). By reading messages written by the ActivityManager Service, an app can
learn about the last Activity that has been drawn on the screen.
Moreover, apps can write arbitrary messages into the system log and this is a common
channel used by developers to receive debug information. We have observed that this
message logging is very commonly left enabled even when apps are released to the public,
and this may help attackers time their actions, better reproduce the status of an app,
or even directly gather sensitive information if debug messages contain confidential data
items.
Given the possible malicious usage of this functionality, an app can only read log
messages created by itself in Android version 4.1 and above.
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getRunningTasks API. An app can get information about currently running apps
by invoking the getRunningTasks API. In particular, it is possible to know which app is on
top and the name of the top Activity. The relatively-common GET TASKS permission
is required to perform such queries.
The functionality of this API has been changed in Android 5.0, so that an app can
only use it to get information about its own Activities. For this reason, in Android 5.0
this API cannot be used anymore to detect which application is currently on top.
Accessing the proc file system. It is possible to get similar information by
reading data from the proc file system, as previous research [15, 9] studied in detail both
in a generic Linux system and in the specific setup of an Android device.
For instance, an app can retrieve the list of running applications by listing the /proc
directory and reading the content of the file: /proc/<process pid>/cmdline. However,
most of the apps have a process running in the background even when a user is not
interacting with them, so this information cannot be used to detect the app showing the
top Activity.
More interestingly, we have identified a technique to detect which is the app
the user is currently interacting with. In particular, the content of the file
/proc/<process pid>/cgroups changes (from “/apps/bg non interactive” to “/apps”)
when the app on top is run by the <process pid>. This is due to the fact that An-
droid (using Linux cgroups) uses the specific “/apps” scheduling category for the app
showing the top activity. We have tested this technique in Android 5.0 and, to the
best of our knowledge, we are the first one pointing out the usage of this technique for
GUI-related attacks in Android.
Finally, as studied in [9], by reading the content of /proc/<process pid>/statm, an
application can infer the graphical state of another app, and precisely identify the specific
Activity with which a user is interacting.
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Techniques to create graphical elements mimicking already existing ones
To effectively replace an Activity of a “victim app,” a convincing copy is necessary. Of
course, an attacker could develop a malicious app from scratch with the same graphical
elements as the original one. However, it is also possible to take the original app, change
its package name, and just add the attack and information-gathering code.
The procedure of modifying an existing app (called repackaging) is well-known in the
Android ecosystem. In the context of this work, repackaging is a useful technique to
expedite development of interfaces that mimic those of other apps. Note, however, that
the attacks described in this section are entirely possible without repackaging. Detecting
and defending from repackaging is outside the scope of this work.
2.2.3 Attack app examples
In practice, malicious apps can combine multiple attack vectors and enhancing tech-
niques to mount stealthy attacks. For instance, the attack app we implemented for our
user study portraits itself as a utility app. When launched, it starts to monitor other run-
ning apps, waiting until the user switches to (or launches) the Facebook app. When that
happens, it uses the startActivity API to spawn a malicious app on top of the genuine
Facebook app. The malicious app is a repackaged version of the actual Facebook app,
with the additional functionality that it leaks any entered user credentials to a remote
location. To be stealthier, it informs Android that it should not be listed in the Recent
Apps view.
We also developed a proof-of-concept malicious app that covers and mimics the home
screen of a device, and demonstration videos. The displayed attack uses the “immersive”
fullscreen functionality, but it can be easily adapted to use the “inescapable” fullscreen
mode described in Section 2.2.1.
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2.3 State exploration of the Android GUI API
We have developed a tool to study how the main Android GUI APIs can be used to
mount a GUI confusion attack. The tool automatically performs a full state exploration
of the parameters of the startActivity API, which can be used to open Activities on top
of others (including Activities of different apps). Also, our tool systematically explores
all Window-drawing possibilities, to check if it is possible to create Windows that:
1. entirely cover the device’s screen;
2. leave the user no way to close them or access the navigation bar.
In the following two sections, we will explain our tool in detail, and we will show what
it has automatically found.
2.3.1 Study of the startActivity API
First, using the documentation and the source code as references, we determined that
three different aspects influence how a newly-started Activity is placed on the Activities’
stack:
• The type of Android component calling startActivity.
• The launchMode attribute of the opened Activity.
• Flags passed to startActivity.
Table 2.2 lists the possible Android component types, all the relevant flags and launch-
Mode values an app can use.
Our tool works by first opening a “victim” app that controls the top Activity. A
different “attacker” app then opens a new Activity calling the startActivity API with
every possible combination of the listed launch modes and flags. This API is called
33
User/User-Interface Trust Relationship Chapter 2
Table 2.2: Component types, flags, and launchMode values tested by our tool
Component type Activity, Service,Content Provider, Broadcast Receiver
launchMode attribute standard, singleTop, singleTask, singleInstance
startActivity flags MULTIPLE TASK, NEW TASK, CLEAR TASK,
CLEAR TOP, PREVIOUS IS TOP,
REORDER TO FRONT, SINGLE TOP,
TASK ON HOME
in four different code locations, corresponding to the four different types of Android
components. Our tool then checks if the newly-opened Activity has been placed on top
of the “victim” app, by taking a screenshot and analyzing the captured image.
Our tool found, in Android version 4.4, the following three conditions under which
an Activity is drawn on top of every other:
1. The Activity is opened by calling the startActivity API from a Service, a Broadcast
Receiver, or a Content Provider and the NEW TASK flag is used.
2. The Activity is opened by calling the startActivity API from another Activity and
it has the singleInstance launch mode.
3. The Activity is opened by calling the startActivity API from another Activity and
one of the following combinations of launch modes and flags is used:
• NEW TASK and CLEAR TASK flags.
• NEW TASK and MULTIPLE TASK flags, and launch mode different from
singleTask.
• CLEAR TASK flag and singleTask launch mode.
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Table 2.3: Window types and flags. Flags in italics are only available starting from An-
droid version 4.4, whereas TYPEs in bold require the SYSTEM ALERT WINDOW
permission.
TYPEs TOAST, SYSTEM ERROR, PHONE, PRIORITY PHONE,
SYSTEM ALERT, SYSTEM OVERLAY
Layout flags IN SCREEN, NO LIMITS,
System-UI
Visibility flags
HIDE NAVIGATION, FULLSCREEN,
LAYOUT HIDE NAVIGATION, LAYOUT FULLSCREEN,
IMMERSIVE, IMMERSIVE STICKY
We are only aware of one previous paper [9] that (manually) studies the behavior
of this API for different parameters and under different conditions. Interestingly, the
authors do not find all the conditions that we discovered. This underlines how the com-
plexity of the Android API and omissions in the official documentation are prone to
creating unexpected behaviors that are triggered using undocumented combinations of
flags and APIs. Such behaviors are hard to completely cover through manual investiga-
tion. Hence, our API exploration tool can effectively help Android developers to detect
these situations. As one example, we will now discuss how our tool revealed the existence
of an “inescapable” fullscreen possibility.
2.3.2 Study of “inescapable” fullscreen Windows
We first checked the documentation and source code to determine the three different
ways in which an app can influence the appearance of a Window that are relevant to our
analysis:
• Modifying the Window’s TYPE.
• Specifying certain flags that determine the Window’s layout.
35
User/User-Interface Trust Relationship Chapter 2
• Calling the setSystemUiVisibility API with specific flags to influence the appearance
and the behavior of the navigation bar and the status bar.
Table 2.3 lists all the relevant flags and Window types an app can use.
Our tool automatically spawns Windows with every possible combination of the listed
types and flags. After spawning each Window, it injects user input that should close a
fullscreen Window, according to the Android documentation (e.g., a “slide” touch from
the top of the screen). It then checks if, after the injection of these events, the Window is
still covering the entire screen, by taking a screenshot and analyzing the captured image.
Using our tool we were able to find ways to create an “inescapable” fullscreen Window
in Android 4.3, 4.4 and 5.0, which we will now briefly describe.
In particular, a Window of type SYSTEM ERROR created with the flag NO LIMITS,
can cover the device’s entire screen in Android 4.3. To specifically address this problem,
a patch has been committed in the Android code before the release of the version 4.4.
This patch limits the position and the size of a Window (so that it cannot cover the
navigation bar) if it has this specific combination of type and flag.
However, this patch does not cover all the cases. In fact, the “immersive” fullscreen
mode introduced in Android 4.4 opens additional ways to create “inescapable” fullscreen
Windows, such as using the SYSTEM ERROR type and then calling the setSystemUiV-
isibility API to set the LAYOUT HIDE NAVIGATION, HIDE NAVIGATION, LAY-
OUT FULLSCREEN, and IMMERSIVE STICKY flags. We verified that the same pa-
rameters create an “inescapable” fullscreen Window in Android 5.0 as well.
It is important to notice that all the ways we discovered to create “inescapable”
fullscreen Windows require using the SYSTEM ERROR type. To fully address this
problem, we propose removing this type or restricting its usage only to system compo-
nents.
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2.4 Detection via static analysis
We developed a static analysis tool to explore how (and whether) real-world apps
make use of the attack vectors and enhancing techniques that we previously explained in
Section 2.2. Our goals with this tool are two-fold:
1. Study if and how the techniques described in Section 2.2 are used by benign apps
and/or by malicious apps, to guide our defense design.
2. Automatically detect potentially-malicious usage of such techniques.
2.4.1 Tool description
Our tool takes as input an app’s apk file and outputs a summary of the potentially-
malicious techniques that it uses. In addition, it flags an app as potentially-malicious if
it detects that the analyzed app has the ability to perform GUI confusion attacks.
Specifically, it first checks which permissions the app requires in its manifest. It then
extracts and parses the app’s bytecode, and it identifies all the invocations to the APIs
related to the previously-described attack techniques. Then, the tool applies backward
program slicing techniques to check the possible values of the arguments for the identified
API calls. The results of the static analyzer are then used to determine whether a
particular technique (or a combination of them) is used by a given application. Finally,
by analyzing the app’s control flow, it decides whether to flag it as (potentially) malicious.
In this section, we will discuss the static analyzer, the attack techniques that we can
automatically detect, and the results we obtained by running the tool on a test corpus
of over two thousand apps. We would like to note that the implementation of the basic
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static analysis tool (namely, the backward program slicer) is not a contribution of this
work: We reused the one that Egele et al. developed for Cryptolint [21], whose source
code was kindly shared with us.
Program slicer
The slicer first decompiles the Dalvik bytecode of a given app by using Andro-
guard [22]. It then constructs an over-approximation of the application’s call graph
representing all possible method invocations among different methods in the analyzed
app. Then, a backward slicing algorithm (based on [23]) is used to compute slices of
the analyzed app. Given an instruction I and a register R, the slicer returns a set of
instructions that can possibly influence the value of R. The slice is computed by recur-
sively following the def-use chain of instructions defining R, starting from instruction I.
If the beginning of a method is reached, the previously-computed call graph is used to
identify all possible calling locations of that method. Similarly, when a relevant register
is the return value of another method call, the backward slicer recursively continues its
analysis from the return instruction of the invoked method, according to the call graph.
As most of the static analysis tools focusing on Android, the slicer may return in-
complete results if reflection, class loading, or native code are used. Dealing with such
techniques is outside the scope of this project.
Detecting potential attack techniques
In the following, we describe how our tool identifies the different attack vectors and
enhancing techniques.
Draw on top. We detect if the addView API, used to create custom Windows, is
invoked with values of the TYPE parameter that give to the newly-created Window a
Z-order higher than that of the top-activity Window.
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In addition, to detect potentially-malicious usage of a toast message, we first look
for all the code locations where a toast message is shown, and then we use the slicer to
check if the setView API is used to customize the appearance of the message. Finally,
we analyze the control flow graph of the method where the message is shown to detect
if it is called in a loop. In fact, to create a toast message that appears as a persistent
Window, it is necessary to call the show API repeatedly.
App Switch. Our tool checks if:
• The startActivity API is used to open an Activity that will be shown on top of
others. As we already mentioned, three aspects influence this behavior: the type of
the Android component from which the startActivity API is called, the launchMode
attribute of the opened Activity, and flags set when startActivity is called. We
determine the first aspect by analyzing the call graph of the app, the launchMode
is read from the app’s manifest file, whereas the used flags are detected by analyzing
the slice of instructions influencing the call to the startActivity API.
• The moveTaskToFront API is used.
• The killBackgroundProcesses API is used.
We do not use as a feature the fact that an app is intercepting the back or power buttons,
as these behaviors are too frequent in benign apps and, being passive methods, they have
limited effectiveness compared to other techniques.
Fullscreen. Our tool checks if the setUiVisibility API is called with flags that cause
it to hide the navigation bar.
Getting information about the device state. Our tool checks if:
• The getRunningTasks API is used.
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• The app reads from the system log. Specifically, since the native utility logcat is
normally used for this purpose, we check if the Runtime.exec API is called specifying
the string “logcat” as parameter.
• The app accesses files in the /proc file system. We detect this by looking for string
constants starting with “/proc” within the app.
We did not use as a feature the fact that an app is a repackaged version of another, as
its usage, even if popular among malware, is not necessary for GUI confusion attacks. If
desired, our system can be completed with detection methods as those presented in [16,
17].
During our study, we found that some apps do not ask (on installation) for the
permissions that would be necessary to call certain APIs for which we found calls in their
code. For instance, we found some applications that contain calls to the getRunningTask
API, without having the GET TASKS permission. The reason behind this interesting
behavior is that this API is called by library code that was included (but never used) in
the app.
In the threat model we consider for this work, we assume that the Android security
mechanisms are not violated. So, calling an API that requires a specific permission will
fail if the app does not have it. For this reason, we do not consider an app as using one
of the analyzed techniques if it lacks the necessary permissions.
Since the version 5.0 of Android has been released too close to the time of this research
was carried out, we expect only a very limited (and not statistically significant) number
of applications using techniques introduced in this version. For this reason, we decided
not to implement the detection of the techniques only available in Android 5.0.
App classification. We classify an app as suspicious if the following three condi-
tions hold:
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1. The app uses a technique to get information about the device state.
2. The app uses an attack vector (any of the techniques in the Draw on top, App
Switch, Fullscreen categories)
3. There is a path in the call graph of the app where Condition 1 (check on the running
apps) happens, and then Condition 2 (the attack vector) happens.
Intuitively, the idea behind our classification approach is that, to perform an effective
attack, a malicious app needs to decide when to attack (Condition 1) and then how to
attack (Condition 2). Also, the check for when an attack should happen is expected to
influence the actual launch of this attack (hence, there is a control-flow dependency of
the attack on the preceding check, captured by Condition 3).
It is important to note that our tool (and the classification rules) are designed to
identify the necessary conditions to perform a GUI confusion attack. That is, we expect
our tool to detect any app that launches a GUI confusion attack. However, our classifi-
cation rules are not sufficient for GUI confusion attacks. In particular, it is possible that
our tool finds a legitimate app that fulfills our static analysis criteria for GUI confusion
attacks. Consider, for example, applications of the “app-locker” category. These apps ex-
hibit a behavior that is very similar to the attacks described in Section 2.2. They can be
configured to “securely lock” (that is, disable) certain other apps unless a user-defined
password is inserted. To this end, they continuously monitor running applications to
check if one of the “locked” apps is opened and, when this happens, they cover it with a
screen asking for an unlock password. At the code level, there is no difference between
such apps and malicious programs. The difference is in the intent of the program, and
the content shown to users when the app takes control of the screen.
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We envision that our tool can be used during the market-level vetting process to spot
apps that need manual analysis since they could be performing GUI confusion attacks.
App-lockers would definitely need this analysis to check whether they are behaving ac-
cording to their specification. In the following evaluation, we do not count app-lockers
and similar programs as false positives. Instead, our system has properly detected an
app that implements functionality that is similar to (and necessary for) GUI confusion
attacks. The final decision about the presence of a GUI confusion attack has to be made
by a human analyst. The reason is that static code analysis is fundamentally unable to
match the general behavior of an app (and the content that it displays) to user expec-
tations. Nonetheless, we consider our static analysis approach to be a powerful addition
to the arsenal of tools that an app store can leverage. This is particularly true under the
assumption that the number of legitimate apps that trigger our static detection is small.
Fortunately, as shown in the next section, this assumption seems to hold, considering
that only 0.4% of randomly chosen apps trigger our detection. Thus, our tool can help
analysts to focus their efforts as part of the app store’s manual vetting process.
One possibility to address the fundamental problem of static code analysis is to look
at the app description in the market6. However, this approach is prone to miss mali-
cious apps, as cybercriminals can deceive the detection system with a carefully-crafted
description (i.e., disguising their password-stealer app as an app-locker).
A second possibility to address this fundamental problem is to devise a defense mech-
anism that empowers users to make proper decisions. One proposal for such a defense
solution is based on the idea of a trusted indicator on the device that reliably and con-
tinuously informs a user about the application with which she is interacting. We will
discuss the details of this solution in Section 2.5.
6A similar concept has been explored in Whyper [24], a tool to examine whether app descriptions
indicate the reason why specific permissions are required.
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2.4.2 Results
We ran our tool on the following four sets of apps:
1. A set of 500 apps downloaded randomly from the Google Play Store (later called
benign1 ).
2. A set of 500 apps downloaded from the “top free” category on the Google Play
Store (later called benign2 ).
3. A set of 20 apps described as app-lockers in the Google Play Store (later called
app-locker).
4. A set of 1,260 apps from the Android Malware Genome project[25] (later called
malicious).
The top part of Table 2.4 shows the usage of five key permissions that apps would
need to request to carry out various GUI confusion attacks, for each of the four different
data sets we used to evaluate our tool. From this data, it is clear that three out of five
permissions are frequently used by benign applications. As a result, solely checking for
permissions that are needed to launch attacks cannot serve as the basis for detection,
since they are too common.
The bottom part of Table 2.4 details how frequently apps call APIs associated with
the different techniques. Again, just looking at API calls is not enough for detection.
Consider a simplistic (grep-style) approach that detects an app as suspicious when it uses,
at least once, an API to get information about the state of the device and one to perform
an attack vector. This would result in an unacceptable number of incorrect detections.
Specifically, this approach would result in classifying as suspicious 33 apps in the benign1
(6.6%) set and 95 in the benign2 set (19.0%).
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Figure 2.3: A screenshot acquired while the sample of the svpeng malware family,
detected by our tool, is attacking the user. The Activity shown in the picture (asking,
in Russian, to insert credit card information) is spawned by the malware while the
user is on the official Google Play Store. Data entered in this Activity is then sent to
a malicious server.
On the benign1 set, our tool flagged two apps as suspicious. Manual investigation
revealed that these applications monitor the user’s Activity and, under specific conditions,
block normal user interaction with the device. Even though these samples do not perform
a GUI confusion attack (since they do not mimic the appearance of another application),
they are both app-lockers. Hence, we expect our tool to report them.
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On the benign2 set, the tool detected 26 applications. When reviewing these apps,
we found that two of them are app-lockers, ten of them are chat or VOIP apps, which
display custom notifications using a separate mechanism than the status bar (such as
stealing focus on an incoming phone call), four are games with disruptive ads, and four
are “performance enhancers” (which monitor and kill the background running apps and
keep a persistent icon on the screen). We also detected two anti-virus programs (which
jump on top when a malicious app is detected) and one (annoying) keyboard app that
jumps on top to offer a paid upgrade. We also had three false positives; two apps that
could be used to take pictures, and one browser. These three apps satisfy the three
conditions used to flag an app as potentially-malicious, but they do not interfere with
the device’s GUI.
The difference between results on sets benign2 and benign1 is due to the fact that
popular apps are significantly bigger and more complex than the randomly-selected ones.
In general, they do more and call a larger variety of APIs. Nonetheless, the total number
of apps that would need to be manually analyzed is small, especially considering the set
of random apps. Hence, an app store could use our system to perform a pre-filtering to
check for apps that can potentially launch GUI confusion attacks, and then use manual
analysis to confirm (or refute) this hypothesis.
To evaluate the detection capabilities (and false negative rate) of our tool, we ran-
domly downloaded from the Google Play Store a set of 20 apps (called app-locker),
described as app-lockers on the store. Since, as previously explained, this category of ap-
plications exhibits a behavior that is very similar to the attacks described in Section 2.2,
we expected our tool to detect them all. Our tool detected 18 out of 20 samples. Manual
investigation revealed that of the two undetected samples, one is currently inoperable
and the other has a data dependency between checking the running apps and launching
the attack (we only check for dependency in the control flow).
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Finally, we tested our tool on the malicious set of 1,260 apps from the Android
Malware Genome project [25]. Overall, most current Android malware is trying to sur-
reptitiously steal and exfiltrate data, trying hard to remain unnoticed. Hence, we would
not expect many samples to trigger our detection. In this set, we detected 25 apps as
suspicious. Upon manual review, we found that 21 of the detected samples belong to the
malware family DroidKungFu. These samples aggressively display an Activity on top of
any other, asking to the user to either grant them “superuser” privileges or enable the
“USB debugging” functionality (so that the root exploit they use can work). Due to code
obfuscation, we could not confirm whether the other four samples were correct detections
or not. To be on the safe side, we count them as incorrect detections.
We also ran our tool on a sample of the svpeng [26] malware family. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the only Android malware family that currently performs GUI
confusion attacks. Specifically, this sample detects when the official Google Play Store is
opened. At this point, as shown in Figure 2.3, the malicious sample spawns an Activity,
mimicking the original “Enter card details” Activity. As expected, our tool was able to
detect this malicious sample. Furthermore, we tested our tool on an Android ransomware
sample known to interfere with the GUI (Android.Fakedefender). As expected, our tool
correctly flagged the app as suspicious, since it uses an enhancing technique (detecting
if the user is trying to uninstall it) and an attack vector (going on top of the uninstall
Activity to prevent users from using it).
Finally, we used our tool to check for the “inescapable” fullscreen technique. Our
tool did not find evidence of its usage in any of the analyzed sets. This suggests that
removing the possibility of using this very specific functionality (as we will propose in
the next section) will not break compatibility with existing applications.
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2.5 UI Defense mechanism
As mentioned, we complete our defense approach with a system designed to inform
users and leave the final decision to them, exploiting the fact that the Android system is
not being fooled by GUI attacks: Recall from Section 2.1.1 that all user-visible elements
are created and managed via explicit app-OS interactions.
What compromises user security (and we consider the root cause of our attacks) is
that there is simply no way for the user to know with which application she is actually
interacting. To rectify this situation, we propose a set of simple modifications to the
Android system to establish a trusted path to inform the user without compromising UI
functionality.
In particular, our proposed modifications need to address three different challenges:
1. Understanding with which app the user is actually interacting.
2. Understanding who the real author of that app is.
3. Showing this information to the user in an unobtrusive but reliable and non-
manipulable way.
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Three independent components address these challenges. The combination of the
states of components one and two determines the information presented to the user by
component three.
Overall, two principles guided our choices:
• Offering security guarantees comparable with how a modern browser presents a
critical (i.e., banking) website, identifying it during the entire interaction and pre-
senting standard and recognizable visual elements.
• Allowing benign apps to continue functioning as if our defense were not in place,
and not burdening the user with extra operations such as continuously using extra
button combinations or requiring specific hardware modifications.
In particular, we wish to present security-conscious users with a familiar environment
consistent with their training, using the same principles that brought different browser
manufacturers to present similar elements for HTTPS-protected sites without hiding
them behind browser-specific interactions.
An overview of the possible cases, how our system behaves for each of them, and the
analogy with the web browser world that inspired our choices is presented in Table 2.7,
while a more detailed description of each of our three components will be presented in
the following sections.
Our implementation will be briefly described in Section 2.5.4, whereas Table 2.6
exemplifies deception methods and recaps how users are defended by our system and
those described in [12] and [9], which target attacks similar to the ones we described
(Section 5.1 provides more details).
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2.5.1 Which app is the user interacting with?
Normally, the top Activity (and, therefore, the top app) is the target of user interac-
tion, with two important exceptions:
1. Utility components such as the navigation bar and the status bar (Section 2.1.1)
are drawn separately by the system in specific Windows.
2. An app, even if not currently on top of the Activity stack, can direct a separate
Window to be drawn over the top-activity Window.
Interactions with utility components are very common and directly mediated by the
system. Thus, we can safely assume that no cross-app interference can be created (the
“Back” button in the navigation bar, for instance, is exclusively controlled by the top
Activity) and we don’t need to consider them (Point 1) in our defense.
However, as exemplified in Section 2.2, Windows shown by different apps (Point 2)
can interfere with the ability of a user to interact correctly with the top app.
While we could prohibit their creation (and thus remove row 3 of Table 2.7), the
ability to create “always-visible” Windows is used by common benign apps: for instance,
the “Facebook Messenger” app provides the ability to chat while using other apps and
it is currently the most popular free app on the Google Play Store. Therefore, we have
decided to simply alert users of the fact that a second app is drawing on top of the current
top app, and leave them free to decide whether they want this cross-app interaction or
not.
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The official Android system also provides a limited defense mechanism:
1. As mentioned, a specific permission is necessary to create always-visible custom
Windows. If it is granted during installation, no other checks are performed. It is
impossible for the top app to prevent extraneous content from being drawn over its
own Activities. Toasts are handled separately and do not require extra permissions.
2. The top app can use the filterTouchesWhenObscured API on its Views (or override
the onFilterTouchEventForSecurity method) to prevent user input when content
from other apps is present at the click location.
Given the attack possibilities, however, these defenses are not exhaustive for our
purposes if not supplemented by the extra visualization we propose, as they still allow
any extraneous content to be present over the top Activity. Moreover, the protection
API can create surprising incompatibilities with benign apps (such as “screen darkeners”)
that use semi-transparent Windows, and does not prevent other apps’ Windows from
intercepting interactions (that is, it can protect only from Windows that “pass through”
input).
The Android API could also be extended to provide more information and leave
developers responsible to defend their own apps, but providing a defense mechanism at
the operating system level makes secure app development much easier and encourages
consistency among different apps.
2.5.2 Who is the real author of a given app?
In order to communicate to the user the fact that she is interacting with a certain
app, we need to turn its unique identifier (the package name, as explained in Section 2.1)
into a message suitable for screen presentation. This message must also provide sufficient
information for the user to decide whether to trust it with sensitive information or not.
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To this aim, we decided to show to the user the app’s developer name and to rely
on the Extended-Validation [27] HTTPS infrastructure to validate it, since Extended-
Validation represents the current best-practice solution used by critical business entities
(such as banks offering online services) to be safely identified by their users. As we will
discuss in the following paragraphs, other solutions could be used, but they are either
unpractical or unsafe.
As a first example, the most obvious solution to identify an application would be
to show the app’s name as it appears in the market, but we would need to rely on
the market to enforce uniqueness and trustworthiness of the names, something that the
current Android markets do not readily provide. The existence of multiple official and
unofficial markets and the possibility of installing apps via an apk archive (completely
bypassing the markets and their possible security checks), make this a complex task. In
fact, we observed several cases in which apps mimic the name and the icon of other apps,
even in the official Google Play market: as an example, Figure 2.4 shows how a search
for the popular “2048” game returns dozens of apps with very similar names and icons.
For this reason, establishing a root of trust to app names and icons (such as in [12]) is
fundamentally unreliable, as these are easily spoofed, even on the official market.
The only known type of vetting on the Google Play market involves a staff-selected
app collection represented on the market with the “Top Developer” badge [28]. This is,
to our knowledge, the only case where market-provided names can be reasonably trusted.
Unfortunately, this validation is currently performed on a limited amount of developers.
Moreover, no public API exists to retrieve this information. When an official method to
automatically and securely obtain this information is released, our system could be easily
adapted to show names retrieved from the market for certified developers, automatically
protecting many well-known apps.
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Relying on market operators is not, however, the only possible solution. The existing
HTTPS infrastructure can be easily used for the same effect. This system also allows
users to transfer their training from the browser to the mobile world: using this scheme,
the same name will be displayed for their bank, for instance, whether they use an Android
app or a traditional web browser.
As far as identifying the developer to the user, two main choices are possible in the
current HTTPS ecosystem. The first one simply associates apps with domain names.
We need to point out, however, that domain names are not specifically designed to resist
spoofing and the lack of an official vetting process can be troublesome.
On the other hand, Extended-Validation (EV) certificates are provided only to legally-
established names (e.g., “PayPal, Inc.”), relying on existing legal mechanisms to protect
against would-be fraudsters, thus preventing a malicious developer to use a name mim-
icking the one of another (e.g., using the name “Facebuuk” instead of “Facebook”).
Extended-Validation certificate are the current mechanism in use by web browsers to
safely identify the owner of a domain and they are available for less than $150 per year:
in general, a substantially lower cost than the one involved in developing and maintaining
any non-trivial application.
Concretely, to re-use a suitable HTTPS EV certification with our protection mech-
anism, the developer simply needs to provide a domain name (e.g., example.com) in a
new specific field in the app’s manifest file, and make a /app signers.txt file available
on the website containing the authorized public keys. During installation (and periodi-
cally, to check for revocations), this file will be checked to ensure that the developer who
signed the app7 is indeed associated with the organization that controls example.com. If
desired, developers can also “pin” the site certificate in the app’s manifest.
7Recall that all apk archives must contain a valid developer signature, whose public key must match
the one used to sign the previous version during app updates.
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Figure 2.4: A search for the popular “2048” game, returning several “clones.” The
app developed by the inventor of the game is listed in fifth position.
It should be noted that several issues have been raised on the overall structure of the
PKI and HTTPS infrastructure (for a summary see, for instance, [29]). Our defense does
not specifically depend on it: in fact, it should be kept in line with the best practices in
how secure sites and browsers interact.
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2.5.3 Conveying trust information to the user
The two components we have described so far determine the possible statuses of the
screen, summarized in the first two columns of Table 2.7. The three right columns of
Table 2.7 present our choices, modeled after the user knowledge, training, and habit ob-
tained through web browsers, since the mobile environment shares with them important
characteristics:
• The main content can be untrusted and interaction with it can be unsafe.
• It is possible for untrusted content to purport to be from reputable sources and
request sensitive user information.
• Cross-entity communications must be restricted and controlled appropriately.
Browsers convey trust-related information to the user mainly via the URL bar. Details
vary among implementations, but it is generally a user element that is always visible
(except when the user or an authorized page requests a fullscreen view) and that shows
the main “trusted” information on the current tab.
For a web site, the main trust information is the base domain name and whether the
page shown can actually be trusted to be from that domain (determined by the usage of
HTTPS, and shown by a “closed lock” icon). A different element is shown when “mixed”
trusted-untrusted information is present. Also, the user is warned that an attack may be
in effect if the validation fails.
Most importantly, information presented in the URL bar is directly connected to the
page it refers to (pages cannot directly draw on the URL bar, nor can they cause the
browser to switch to another tab without also changing information shown on the URL
bar).
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On the Android platform, we choose the navigation bar as the “trusted” position that
will behave like the URL bar. As browsers display different URL bars for different tabs,
we also dynamically change information shown on the navigation bar: at every instant
in time, we make sure it matches the currently visible status (e.g., the bar changes as
Activities are moved on top of the stack, no matter how the transition was triggered).
In other words, the security indicators are always shown as long as the navigation bar is.
The navigation bar is in many ways a natural choice as a “trusted” GUI in the
Android interface, as apps cannot directly modify its appearance and its functionality is
vital to ensure correct user interaction with the system (e.g., the ability for a user to go
back to the “home” page or close an app).
Fullscreen apps. To ensure our defense reliability and visibility, our defense
mechanism needs to deal with scenarios in which an application hides the content of
the navigation bar (on which we show our security indicator) by showing a fullscreen
Activity. This allows a malicious application to render a fake navigation bar in place of
the original one.
For this reason, to further prove the authenticity of the information shown by our de-
fense system, we complemented our system by using a “secret image” (also called security
companion). This image is chosen by the user among a hundred different possibilities
(images designed to be recognizable at a small size) and it is displayed together with
our lock indicator (see Figure 2.1) making it impossible to correctly spoof it. In fact, a
malicious application has no way to know which is the secret image selected by the user.
This system is similar to the “SiteKey” or “Sign-in Seal” mechanisms used by several
websites to protect their login pages (i.e., [10], [11]), with the considerable advantage that
users are constantly exposed to the same security companion whenever they interact with
verified apps or with the base system.
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The user has the opportunity to select the secret image during the device’s first-boot
or by using a dedicated system application. After that a secret image is selected, its
functionality is briefly explained to the user. To prevent a malicious application from
inferring the image chosen by the user, we store it in a location unreadable by non-system
applications.
In addition, we modify the system so that the chosen image will not appear in screen-
shots (note that the Android screenshot functionality is mediated by the operating sys-
tem). Also note that non-system applications cannot automatically take screenshots
without explicit user collaboration.
We also propose the introduction of a fullscreen mode which still shows security
indicators (but not the rest of the navigation bar), in case apps designed for fullscreen
operation wish to show their credentials on some of their Activities.
Finally, we prevent applications from creating “inescapable” fullscreen Windows, by
simply removing the possibility to use the specific Window’s type that makes it possible
(refer to Section 2.3.2 for the technical details). As pointed out in Section 2.4.2, we do
not expect this change in the current Android API to interfere with any existing benign
application.
2.5.4 Implementation
Our prototype is based on the Android Open Source Project (AOSP) version of
Android (tag android-4.4 r1.2 ). Some components are implemented from scratch, others
as modifications of existing system Services.
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The proposed modifications can be easily incorporated into every modern Android
version, since they are built on top of standard, already existing, user-space Android
components. Their footprint is around 600 LOCs, and we ported them from Android 4.2
to 4.4 without significant changes.
Interaction-target app detection. This component retrieves the current state of
the Activity stack and identifies the top app, by accessing information about the Activity
stack (stored in the ActivityManager Service).
We also check (via the WindowManager Service) if each Window currently drawn on
the device respects at least one of the following three properties:
1. The Window has been generated by a system app.
2. The Window has been generated by the top app.
3. The Window has not been created with flags that assign it a Z-order higher than
that of the top-activity Window.
If all the drawn Windows satisfy this requirement, we can be sure that user interaction
can only happen with the top app or with trusted system components. This distinguishes
the second and third row of Table 2.7.
Database and author verification Service. A constantly-active system Service
stores information about the currently installed apps that purport to be associated with a
domain name. This Service authenticates the other components described in this section
and securely responds to requests from them.
This Service also performs the HTTPS-based author verification as described previ-
ously8. The PackageManager system Service notifies this component whenever a new
app is installed.
8For our evaluation prototype, static trust information was used to demonstrate attacks and defense
on popular apps without requiring cooperation from their developers.
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User interaction modification. The navigation bar behavior is modified to
dynamically show information about the Activity with which the user is interacting, as
described in Table 2.7. We also added a check in the ActivityManager Service to block
apps from starting when necessary (cases listed in the fourth and fifth rows of Table 2.7).
2.6 Evaluation
We performed an experiment to evaluate:
• The effectiveness of GUI confusion attacks: do users notice any difference or glitch
when a malicious app performs a GUI confusion attack?
• How helpful our proposed defense mechanism is in making the users aware that the
top Activity spawned by the attack is not the original one.
We recruited human subjects via Amazon Mechanical Turk9, a crowd-sourced Internet
service that allows for hiring humans to perform computer-based tasks. We chose it to
get wide, diversified subjects. Previous research has shown that it can be used effectively
for performing surveys in research [30]. IRB approval was obtained by our institution.
We divided the test subjects into three groups. Subjects in Group 1 used an unmodi-
fied Android system, to assess how effective GUI confusion attacks are on stock Android.
Subjects in Group 2 had our on-device defense active, but were not given any additional
explanation of how it works, or any hint that their mobile device would be under attack.
This second group is meant to assess the behavior of “normal” users who just begin using
the defense system, without any additional training. To avoid influencing subjects of the
first two groups, we advertised the test as a generic Android “performance test” without
mentioning security implications. Finally, subjects in Group 3, in addition to using a
9https://www.mturk.com
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system with our on-device defense, were also given an explanation of how it works and
the indication that there might be attacks during the test. This last group is meant
to show how “power users” perform when given a short training on the purpose of our
defense.
Subjects interacted through their browser10 with a hardware-accelerated emulated
Android 4.4 system, mimicking a Nexus 4 device. For subjects in Group 2 and Group 3,
we used a modified Android version in which the defense mechanisms explained in Sec-
tion 2.5 had been implemented.
2.6.1 Experiment procedure
The test starts with two general questions, asking the subjects i) their age and ii) if
they own an Android device. These questions are repeated, in a different wording, at
the end of the test. We use these questions to filter out subjects that are just answering
randomly (once given, each answer is final and cannot be reviewed or modified).
Then, subjects in Group 2 and Group 3 are asked to choose their “security companion”
in the emulator (which is, for example, the image of the dog in Figure 2.1), picking among
several choices of images as they would be asked to do at the device’s first boot to set
up our defense. The selected image will be then shown in our defense widget on the
navigation bar.
Then, subjects are instructed to open the Facebook app in the emulator. We chose
this particular app because it is currently the second most popular free app, and it asks
for credentials to access sensitive information. The survey explains to our subjects that
the screen of a real Nexus 4 device is being streamed to their browser, and that the
application they just opened is the real one. We have included this step because, in a
10We used the noVNC client, http://kanaka.github.io/noVNC
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Task B1 and Task B2 (real Facebook app)
Task Astd (non-fullscreen attack app)
Task Afull (fullscreen, defense-aware, attack app)
Figure 2.5: Appearance of the navigation bar for subjects using our defense (Group
2 and Group 3), assuming they chose the dog as their security companion. Note that
a non-fullscreen app cannot control the navigation bar: only a fullscreen app can try
to spoof it. In all attacks, the malicious application was pixel-perfect identical to the
real Facebook app.
previous run of our experiment, a sizable amount of our subjects did not believe that the
phone was “real,” and so they did not considered as “legitimate” any interaction they
had with it.
Subjects are then instructed to open the Facebook app in the emulator several times,
leaving them free to log in if they want to. After a few seconds, we hide the emulator and
ask our subjects about their interaction. Specifically, we ask if they think they interacted
with the original Facebook application as they did at the very beginning. Subjects had
to respond both in a closed yes-no form and by providing a textual explanation. We used
the closed answers to quantitatively evaluate the subjects’ answers and the open ones to
get insights about subjects’ reasoning process and to spot problems they may have had
with our infrastructure.
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We decided against evaluating the effectiveness of our defense by checking if users have
logged in. This is because, in previous experiments, we noticed that security-conscious
users would avoid surrendering their personal credentials in an online survey (regardless
of any security indicator), but would not be careful if provided with fake credentials.
Instead, we decided to ask the subjects to perform four different tasks: B1, B2, Astd, and
Afull.
During Task B1 and Task B2, subjects are directed to open the Facebook app. In
these two tasks, this will simply result in opening the real Facebook app.
In Task Astd we deliver the attack described in Section 2.2.3 while the subjects are
opening Facebook. As a result, the device will still open the real Facebook app, but on
top of it there will be an Activity that (even though it looks just like the real Facebook
login screen) actually belongs to our malicious app. In Groups 2 and Group 3, which
have our defense active, our widget in the navigation bar will show that the running
app is not certified, by showing no security indicator on the navigation bar. Therefore,
subjects in Group 2 and 3 may detect the attack by noticing the missing widget.
Differently, in Task Afull, we simulate a fullscreen attack. In this case, our malicious
app will take control of the whole screen. The malicious app can mimic perfectly the
look and feel of anything that would be shown on the screen, but it cannot display the
correct security companion (because it does not know which one it is). The fullscreen
attack app must then mimic to its best the look of our defense widget, but it will show
a different security companion, hoping that the user will not notice. For this reason,
subjects in Group 2 and Group 3 can detect the attack if (and only if) they notice that
our widget is not showing the “correct” security companion they had chosen. Note that
this puts our defense in its worst-case scenario, with pixel-perfect reproduction of the
original app and the defense widget except for the user-selected secret image.
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Note that for subjects in Group 1 this task looks exactly the same as Task Astd: if the
navigation bar never shows security indicators, we assume it would be counterproductive
for an attacker to drastically alter it by showing a “spoofed” security indicator.
The four tasks are presented in a randomized order. This prevents biasing results in
case performing a task during a specific step of the experiment (e.g., at the beginning)
could “train” subjects to answer better in subsequent tasks.
Figure 2.6.1 summarizes what has been shown on the navigation bar to the subjects
in Group 2 and Group 3 during the execution of the different tasks.
2.6.2 Results
In total, 347 subjects performed and finished our test. However, we removed 39
subjects because the control questions were inconsistent (e.g., How old are you? More
than 40. What’s your age? 21.), the same person tried to retake the test, or the subject
encountered technical problems during the test. This left us with 308 valid subjects in
total. The results of the experiment are shown in Table 2.8.
The vast majority of subjects in Group 1, using stock Android, were not able to
correctly identify attacks and often noticed no difference (typically, answering that they
were using the real Facebook in all tasks) or reported minimal animation differences due
to the reduced frame rate and emulator speed (unrelated to the attacks). This corrobo-
rates our opinion that these attacks are extremely difficult to identify. In particular, only
8.08% of the subjects detected both attacks and only 2.02% of the subjects answered all
questions correctly. Manual review of the textual answers revealed that this happened
randomly (that is, the subjects did not notice any relevant graphical difference among
the different tasks).
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Comparing results for Group 1 and Group 2, it is clear that the defense helped subjects
in detecting the attacks. Specifically, the percentage of correct detections increased from
19.19% to 64.52% for Task Astd (χ
2 = 40.68, p < 0.0001)11 and from 17.17% to 76.34%
(χ2 = 67.63, p < 0.0001) for Task Afull. Also, the number of subjects able to answer
correctly all times increased from 2.02% to 53.76% (p < 0.0001, applying Fisher’s exact
test).
Comparing detection results of the two attacks, we found that the detection rate for
the fullscreen attack is slightly better than the one for the non-fullscreen one. However,
this difference is not statistically significant. In particular, considering Group 2 and
Group 3 together, 66.99% of the subjects answered correctly during Task Astd and 75.12%
answered correctly during Task Afull (χ
2 = 3.36, p = 0.0668).
We also noticed that the number of subjects answering correctly during the non-
attack tasks (Tasks B1 and B2) did not increase when our defense was active. In other
words, we did not find any statistical evidence that our defense leads to false positives.
Finally, results for Group 2 and Group 3 are generally very similar, with just a
slight (not statistically significant) improvement for subjects in Group 3 in the ability to
answer correctly all questions (χ2 = 0.21, p = 0.6506). This may hint to the fact that our
additional explanation was not very effective, or simply to how the mere introduction of
a security companion and defense widget puts users “on guard,” even without specific
warnings.
11We evaluate results using 95% confidence intervals. Applying the Bonferroni correction, this means
that the null hypothesis is rejected if p < 0.01.
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2.6.3 Limitations
As mentioned, we took precaution not to influence users’ choices during the experi-
ment. In particular, subjects in Group 2 used a system with our defense in place, but
without receiving any training about it before. Nonetheless, they had to set up their
security companion prior to starting the experiment, as this step is integral to our de-
fense and cannot be skipped when acquiring a new device. We designed our experiment
to simulate, as accurately as possible, the first-use scenario of a device where our pro-
posed defense is in place. In this scenario, users would be prompted to choose a security
companion during the device’s first boot. We acknowledge, however, that this step may
have increased the alertness of our subjects so that our results may not be completely
representative of the effect that our defense widget has on users, especially over a long
period of time.
Similarly, the fact that subjects, at the beginning of the experiment, were made to
interact with the original Facebook application may have helped them in answering to
the different tasks. However, we assume it is unlikely that users are being attacked by
a malicious app performing a GUI confusion attack during the very first usage of their
device.
It is also possible that the usage of an emulator, accessed using a web browser, may
have had a negative impact on the subjects’ ability to detect our attacks. It should
be noted, however, that the usage of an x86 hardware-accelerated emulator (and VNC)
resulted in a good-performance, to the point we would recommend this setup to future
experimenters (unless, of course, they have the time and resources to gather enough
participants and use real devices).
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Finally, there is a possibility that the subject’s network was introducing delays. From
the network’s point of view, the emulation appears as a continuous VNC session from
the beginning to the end. This setup should not specifically affect individual tasks, but
may have caused some jitter for subjects.
2.7 Conclusions
In this work, we analyzed in detail the many ways in which Android users can be
confused into misidentifying an app. We categorized known attacks, and disclose novel
ones, that can be used to confuse the user’s perception and mount stealthy phishing and
privacy-invading attacks.
We have developed a tool to study how the main Android GUI APIs can be used
to mount such an attack, performing a full state exploration of the parameters of these
APIs, and detecting problematic cases.
Moreover, we developed a two-layered defense. To prevent such attacks at the market
level, we have developed another tool that uses static analysis to identify code in apps
that could be leveraged to launch GUI confusion attacks, and we have evaluated its
effectiveness by analyzing both malicious applications and popular benign ones.
To address the underlying user interface limitations, we have presented an on-device
defense system designed to improve the ability of users to judge the impact of their
actions, while maintaining full app functionality. Using analogies with how web browsers
present page security information, we associate reliable author names to apps and present
them in a familiar way.
Finally, we have performed a user study demonstrating that our on-device defense
improves the ability of users to notice attacks.
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Chapter 3
Trusting the Operating System for
Remote Authentication
Mobile applications (“apps”) have evolved from being simple conveniences, into com-
plex systems, aimed at powering the latest generation of Internet-connected, distributed,
massively multi-user services. This implies that these apps depend to some extent on
backend services to function. For example, many apps function as frontends for existing
online services, where their entire behavior is tightly coupled to the remote service. To
handle multiple users securely on these backends, some sort of authentication needs to
occur.
Traditionally, this procedure relies on a combination of “user-private” credentials,
such as username and password. However, given the incredibly crowded market in which
these apps compete and the fickle nature of users, there is a significant pressure to lower
the “friction” new users encounter when using an app. For this reason, applications are
moving away from authentication schemes based on user-private credentials, toward those
schemes that are more automatic. An existing solution that is often used to accomplish
this is OAuth, an authorization mechanism that can enable users to leverage accounts
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on identity services, such as Google and Facebook, without creating new, ad-hoc, ones.
Nonetheless, developers constantly strive to create novel, custom authentication mecha-
nisms to increase the ease-of-use of their applications.
In this paper, we study and characterize a new broad class of vulnerable authentica-
tion schemes, which fully rely on what we call device-public information. With this term,
we refer to all information, properties, and data that can be accessed by any application
(with proper permissions, as explained in Section 3.2.2) installed on the same device.
As an example, consider a messaging app that, after users identify themselves, stores
a token in the device’s external storage, which any app can access. The app then sends
this token to the app’s backend server each time it is used, as a form of authentication.
This technique has the advantage that if the user uninstalls the app and later wants to
use it again, the token will persist on the external storage, and no re-authentication will
be required. Unfortunately, this versatility comes at a price: a malicious app running on
the same device can obtain and leak this token to a remote attacker, who can now easily
hijack the user’s account. Even if an app is leveraging a technology such as OAuth, poor
handling of the resulting tokens could render them device-public as well. This is just one
possible scenario for the mis-use of device-public information; apps can and do use such
schemes as the only form of authentication, without requiring private data from the user
such as a password, rendering their associated accounts wide-open to malicious apps on
the device.
In work presented in this chapter, we perform the first comprehensive analysis and
characterization of vulnerable authentication schemes based on device-public information.
We start by describing the identity-transfer attack, a generic exploitation technique,
composed by two steps. First, a malicious app, termed the “ID Leaker,” steals all device-
public information from a victim’s device without any user interaction. Then, this app
transfers this data to “ID Injector,” an app installed on the attacker’s device that collects
72
Trusting the Operating System for Remote Authentication Chapter 3
the received information and injects them into the device. Once this step is completed,
the attacker can simply install the vulnerable target app, which will automatically log
the attacker in the victim’s account.
We also take the first step toward understanding how widespread this class of vulner-
abilities is, by developing a dynamic analysis system that aims at uncovering potentially-
vulnerable apps among a much larger set. While “authentication” is a difficult behavior
to characterize, we can leverage interesting behavioral patterns to locate authentication
with enough accuracy to help a human analyst determine if a vulnerability is present.
In particular, the system we developed records the app’s user interface behavior during
its first execution on a device, when authentication and registration is likely to appear.
Then, as a second step, the system wipes the app’s private data (by uninstalling and
then re-installing the app), and it runs the app once again. The key intuition is that if
the behavior of an app changes after the re-installation, it means the app somehow relies
on device-public information for authentication, and is very likely to be vulnerable to
our attack. As a final step, our system attempts to confirm the vulnerability by using
the generic exploitation technique described above to transfer the identity used in the
previous steps to an entirely new device.
Although some of the ideas and intuitions behind this work can be applied to any
mobile operating system (and the corresponding apps), in this work we focus on Android.
This choice has been motivated by two main reasons: the fact that Android is currently
the most widespread mobile operating system [31] and the ease of performing automatic
analyses on Android apps.
We used this analysis system to vet 1,000 of the most popular applications from the
Google Play Store, and 41 of them were correctly identified as vulnerable. Two of these
vulnerable apps were WhatsApp and Viber, two of the most popular messaging apps,
which are used by hundreds of millions of users. For both these apps, we discovered that
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it was sufficient to steal the content of a single file (and spoof the value of some device’s
identifiers) to fully hijack a user account. We reported our findings to the respective
security teams, which quickly acknowledged the vulnerabilities. Among the apps flagged
as vulnerable, our system also identified several popular games that allow a user to
purchase virtual objects or currency: our automatically generated exploit was able to
hijack these accounts as well. We conclude this work by proposing and implementing
solutions for the identified class of vulnerabilities.
In summary, the contributions of this work are as follows:
• We identify and study a new class of insecure authentication schemes that rely on
device-public information.
• We demonstrate how it is possible to automatically exploit these vulnerable schemes
by developing a generic “identity-transfer” attack, which is capable of stealing and
replaying device-public information to hijack accounts.
• We explore the scope of the vulnerability in 1,000 popular apps from the Google
Play Store using an automated dynamic analysis system, and identified 41 vulner-
able apps, including Viber and WhatsApp.
• We propose and implement solutions to the identified problems.
3.1 Authentication Schemes
Authentication in mobile applications can take on a variety of distinct forms, with
differing security properties. The first, and most obvious, authentication scheme is the
traditional username and password, in which the user is asked directly by the authenticat-
ing app for credentials. The app then sends these credentials to its backend server, which
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verifies their correctness. After this step, the server sends to the app a token, which is a
shared secret string that can be used for authenticating all following interactions between
the client and the server.
Another way to authenticate is to use third-party authentication services. This
method removes the need to handle tedious per-app registrations. In Android, the
AccountManager [32] offers a generic API that can be used to obtain an OAuth-like
authentication token from third-party identity providers, such as Google or Facebook.
The obtained token is presented with the app’s requests to its backend, and can then be
used by the backend to ask the third-party service for more information about the user.
Another popular scheme uses text messages (SMS) and the user’s phone number as
a form of authentication. In this scenario, the user would need to prove that they own a
given phone number. As a part of the verification process, the user would typically enter
the phone number manually. A code is then sent via SMS to the user, and is typically
parsed automatically from the user’s SMS inbox and verified. After this step, the phone
number is used as the user’s primary identity.
Lastly, some Android apps employ schemes in which distinguishing information about
the device itself is used to bind a device to an account. This works under the implicit
assumption that these identifiers are static and unique per device. To authenticate,
the required identifiers are sent to the app’s backend server, an authentication token is
obtained, and such token is then sent along with future requests.
To reach the widest possible audience, many apps offer multiple authentication
schemes, such as Facebook, Google, or regular user name and password authentication.
While some of these methods may be securely implemented, the app may still be vul-
nerable if it allows users to use unsafe login-less methods that rely only on device-public
information.
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At their core, all these authentication schemes aim to obtain some sort of token
that can be used to authenticate a user to the app’s remote backend. However, if the
authentication token can be obtained using information that another application on the
same device can obtain, the authorization scheme is not safe. We also note that, even
when apps employ schemes that are thought to be secure, they can still be vulnerable to
account hijacking if they store authentication tokens in publicly accessible locations.
3.2 Identity-Transfer Attack
Our key observation is that if an app only relies on device-public information to
authenticate the user to its backend, it is possible for a malicious app to mine and leak
all relevant information. If such a scheme is in use, an attacker can perform an identity-
transfer attack, transferring information from the victim’s device to the attacker’s, so
that the user’s identity associated to a given app is effectively transferred.
3.2.1 Threat Model
In this chapter, we assume that an attacker is able to lure the user into installing
an attacker-controlled malicious application. This application requests all the needed
permissions to acquire the device-public information being stolen, as outlined in Sec-
tion 3.2.2. Moreover, we assume the operating system of the device to be uncompro-
mised, and it thus constitutes a trusted computing base. Furthermore, we assume that
the victim’s device is not rooted (if it is, our attack does not take advantage of it), which
means that an attacker cannot get root privileges. Therefore, the malicious app does not
have access to app-private data, as the separation of the apps’ private storage is strictly
enforced by the OS.
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3.2.2 Device-Public Information Sources
We refer to device-public information as information that can be accessed from any
app on the device that requests the permissions needed to obtain it. We will focus
primarily on Android versions ranging from Android 4.4 to Android 7. When necessary,
we will describe differences among different versions.
Here we will discuss the different sources of device-public information we have consid-
ered in our study, which are used by apps to identify users (also summarized in Table 3.1).
Some of these identifiers are related to a specific hardware device, and cannot be changed
by the user, whereas others can be changed after a “factory reset” of the device, or are
linked to a Google Account. Google has recently attempted to hide some identifiers from
apps to thwart tracking. That said, as of Android 7.1.1, we found that we are still able
to access every identifier mentioned here, save for the Bluetooth MAC address.
Apps may need specific permissions to access some of these sources of device-public
information, therefore a careful user may be able to notice that a malicious application is
accessing some device-public information. However, while Android 6 introduced a feature
alerting the user at the time some permissions are used, a malicious app can bypass this
alert by lowering its own “Target SDK Version.” By doing this, the old permission model,
in which the user is not informed the moment an app uses a permission, is used.
ANDROID ID. This is a device’s unique ID number, set by Android upon a device’s
first boot or factory reset.
IMEI. The IMEI is a hardware identifier given to each piece of cellular equipment,
including the baseband radios of mobile phones.
WiFi MAC address. Similar to the IMEI, MAC addresses are uniquely assigned to
most conventional network hardware. The WiFi MAC address can be obtained by any
app requesting the ACCESS WIFI STATE, using the API WifiInfo.getMacAddress(). In
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Android 6 (and later versions), the behavior of this API has been changed, so that it
always returns the value 02:00:00:00:00:00. However, we found that it is still possible
to access this identifier using the NetworkInterface.getHardwareAddress() API.
Bluetooth MAC Address. The device’s Bluetooth MAC address is a persistent hard-
ware identifier that can be queried by using the API BluetoothAdapter.getAddress().
This API requires the BLUETOOTH permission. Starting from Android 6, the behavior of
this API has been changed, so that it always returns the value 02:00:00:00:00:00.
ADB serial number. The device’s ADB Serial Number, which is used to identify
devices on the Android Debug Bridge, is an identifier that persists across factory resets.
It can be accessed by querying the android.os.SystemProperties object using the key
ro.serialno.
Google account email. Many Android devices use Google account emails as a form
of Single Sign-On, and the email address used can be easily obtained using the Account-
Manager API.
Google Service Framework ID. This ID is used to identify a user when accessing
Google Service Framework applications.
Google Advertising ID. In an attempt to allow users to opt-out of mobile ad tracking
campaigns, Google created a specific persistent identifier [33] to be used with advertising.
It can be queried by any app (through the AdvertisingIdClient class in the Google
Play Services), but, unlike the other identifiers, also freely reset by the user. Google’s
policy [34] states that all advertising must use exclusively this identifier for tracking (“in
place of any other device identifiers for any advertising purposes”), although in practice
it is often not used [35].
Phone number. We consider the phone number associated with the SIM card inserted
in a device as device-public information. A specific API (getLine1Number, requiring
the READ PHONE STATE permission) exists to retrieve this value, however the re-
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turned value is not always reliable, depending on the SIM Card manufacturer. Various
workarounds do exist, including reading the call log, which requires the READ CALL LOG
permission.
Received SMS Messages. Any app (with proper permissions) can request to be
notified of the origin and content of new SMS messages.
Incoming Phone Calls. Apps can request to be notified about the basic data of
incoming calls, including the caller’s number. Additionally, Apps can also read the call
history. Interestingly, phone calls can be used for authentication, by using part of the
sender’s phone number (which remote services can control) as a verification code.
SIM Card Serial Number. In devices where a SIM Card is present, apps can access
this identifier, which is tied to the used SIM Card, by using the getSimSerialNumber
API.
External Storage. Many Android devices today come with, or have the ability to add,
some form of external storage, usually in the form of a larger Flash-based storage device
or SD card. The precise behavior of external storage differs among Android versions and
devices, but, typically, any app can request the READ EXTERNAL STORAGE permission to
access its contents. This gives the app access to the public areas of the external storage,
shared by all apps.
Files stored in here are publicly accessible and some of them are not deleted upon
app’s uninstallation [36]. Therefore, as a usability feature for the users, some apps
store authentication cookies in this location, so that the credentials survive app’s re-
installation. Unfortunately, while this may sound a reasonable practice, it is not secure.
In fact, in this scenario, an attacker would be able to easily hijack the user’s account
by reading the files containing these authentication cookies and using their content to
authenticate with the victim apps’ remote backends.
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3.2.3 Proof-of-Concept Attack Implementation
In simple terms, the attack consists of an app on the victim’s device, which steals a set
of device- and user-specific information, and exfiltrates it to the attacker. The attacker
can then inject this information into their own device, so that apps behave seamlessly
as if they are still on the victim’s device. In particular, the attacker can use vulnerable
apps as if authenticated as the victim on the victim’s phone.
We implemented the “identity transfer” attack in two different components: the “ID
Leaker,” and the “ID Injector.” The “ID Leaker” app, which could be thought of as a
prototypical third-party malicious application, requires the Android permissions to access
the SMS, device call notifications, external storage contents, and static device identifiers
(refer to Table 3.1). The app then uses the well-documented Android APIs to access
and leak the device-public data that constitutes the user’s identity, and it sends it to the
attacker’s device. We note that the app’s functionality could be easily hidden inside a
seemingly legitimate app, and that it can run on completely unmodified devices without
requiring any admin privileges (therefore on un-rooted devices). We also note that if an
attacker aims at hijacking the account of a specific victim app, the “ID Leaker” only
requires the permissions needed to access the specific device-public information used by
the victim app for authentication purposes.
For the attacker’s device, we created the “ID Injector,” which takes data from the
“ID Leaker” and injects them into an attacker-controlled device. We use the Xposed
framework [37] (a tool for performing run-time patching of the Android framework) to
easily hook the Android API methods used to query device-public information, and spoof
their results to return the data leaked from the victim. The external storage’s content
is also transferred from the victim and copied into place. Without external information,
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there is no way for the app under analysis to tell that the data has been spoofed. Because
of our usage of the Xposed framework, the attacker-controlled device (but not the victim’s
one) must be rooted to properly spoof the received identity.
3.3 Vulnerability Detection
In order to understand how widespread device-public authentication schemes are on
Android, we created an automated system to locate vulnerable apps in the wild. This
system could also be used by security researchers, software developers, and app market
operators to automatically spot weakness in the authentication mechanisms used by the
analyzed apps.
While the attack described in Section 3.2.3 is very effective against vulnerable apps,
we cannot simply use it against all apps to build a detection system, for two main
reasons. First, it is difficult to differentiate success of the attack from other application
behaviors, as we have no baseline of the app’s normal behavior to compare it to, and
cannot link changes in this behavior to device-public information. Second, as we discuss
in Section 3.1, “authentication” can be implemented in a variety of ways, making it
difficult, if not impossible, to concretely define and locate authentication behaviors in a
generalized way. We therefore cannot rely on any direct knowledge of the authentication
itself to help understand when our exploit is having an effect.
To address these challenges, we developed an approach that aims at identifying au-
thentication behaviors indirectly. We build our approach on the observation that an app
behaves differently depending on whether or not it has already authenticated its user to
a previously created account, and that this difference will be reflected in the app’s user
interface.
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Thus, as a first step, the system executes the app, provides any requested device-
public information to the app, and records the app’s behaviors. These behaviors are in
the form of a trace of different UI states (as detailed in Section 3.3.4). The aim of this
initial execution is both to trigger the app’s authentication or registration mechanism,
as well as to get the server’s backend to store some sort of state for the user, which can
be observed in future traces.
Next, all app-private information for the app is deleted. We achieve this by unin-
stalling and re-installing the app. This operation deletes all app’s files in private locations.
At this point, the app is executed again and, if the behavior is different from the
one observed during the first run, it is possible that the app may be using device-public
information (which could be both device’s identifiers or publicly accessible files in the
external storage) to authenticate the user. Typically, a difference may be observable
because of the absence of a “login” screen due to already being authenticated, or the
absence of an introductory “welcome” screen due to restoring the previously-saved user
state, but more subtle UI modifications are possible.
As a last step, the system confirms the vulnerability, by transferring the device-
public information to a different device, executing the app again, and comparing these
behaviors with the previous ones. This transfer operation encompasses copying both
publicly accessible files and device’s identifiers.
In the remainder of this section, we will first discuss in detail the three steps of our
analysis, as shown in Figure 3.1. We will then provide several technical details about the
underlying dynamic analysis and the comparison of states and traces.
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3.3.1 Step 1: Capturing Initial Behavior
First, we need to characterize the behavior of a given application when installed for
the first time on an Android device. Our system functions primarily by collecting and
comparing traces, consisting of an ordered list of UI states encountered during a given
execution of the app. Details of how states and traces are collected and compared can
be found in Section 3.3.4.
However, our system truly needs to characterize the “normal” behavior, not just
merely record one execution. This is far from trivial, mainly due to the fact that dy-
namic analysis is hindered by non-deterministic behaviors present in apps, the OS, and
network communications. To address this challenge, we first execute the analyzed ap-
plication on multiple devices, collecting multiple traces. Recent work has shown that
running the same app multiple times is, in Android, effective in reducing the effects of
non-deterministic behaviors during dynamic analysis [38]. The collected app behaviors
are then used to compute a so-called Invariant, representing the most common set of
behaviors. Specifically, the Invariant set is computed as the set of all states that appear
in all the collected traces.
3.3.2 Step 2: Vulnerability Detection
In this step, we delete all app-private data from the devices used in Step 1, collect new
traces, and compare them with the Invariant. We accomplish clearing the app-private
data by re-installing the app, which is known to remove all app-private information,
including authentication tokens, cookies, databases and other private files.
After re-installation, the app is dynamically stimulated, and traces are collected in
the same way as in Step 1. Then, we compare the new traces against the Invariant,
looking for behavioral differences in the traces. These discrepancies are typically due to
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setup, registration, or login interfaces. Therefore, they are a strong signal the app was
able to authenticate with the remote backend, only using information that survived the
app’s re-installation, which must therefore be device-public.
More precisely, if we determine that, during the execution of the analyzed app in this
step, at least one state present in the Invariant has been skipped in all the collected
traces, the app is flagged as potentially vulnerable.
3.3.3 Step 3: Exploit Verification
In Step 3, we verify if an app uses an insecure authentication scheme by actually
attempting an identity-transfer attack against it.
To perform the attack, we transfer the device-public information stored in the devices
used during Step 1 and Step 2 to new devices (which have not been used in the analysis
of this app before), as explained in Section 3.2.3. Then, the same procedure used in
Step 1 is used to obtain execution traces from the previously-unused devices.
These traces are then compared against the Invariant, as in Step 2. If we detect that
at least one of the states skipped during Step 2 is also always skipped during Step 3, we
conclude that the attack succeeded, and we flag the app as vulnerable.
3.3.4 Dynamic Analysis
In order to accomplish the above steps, we need to deterministically execute an ap-
plication to trigger the authentication behavior, while minimizing behavioral divergences
due to non-deterministic operating system or network behaviors. To this end, our system
stimulates apps through their UIs, including buttons, text fields, and other interactive
elements, as well as taking note of any incoming SMS and phone calls the used device
may receive.
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We rely on uiautomator [39], both to control the device and to obtain state information
about the device itself. We control uiautomator from a normal PC by connecting it to the
device using the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) and the uiautomator Python wrapper [40].
Possible actions are derived from the UI’s content (button labels, text field descrip-
tions, . . . ), and inserted into a priority queue. The priorities are arranged such that
the most specific actions are performed first. The developed system also keeps track
of previously touched UI elements, removing them from the priority list, so that every
element is touched at most once. This is done to prevent the stimulation from entering
an infinite-loop by continuously interacting with the same element.
The following is a list of the actions that our detection system can perform, in order
of priority:
Fill text fields. Our system automatically fills some text fields. In particular, it first
determines the type of information a text field is suppose to contain by (similar to [41])
checking labels and IDs associated to each text field against a pre-determined list of
strings. Then, if a text field is determined as asking for a phone number, our system fills
it with the device’s phone number. Likewise, if a text field is determined as asking for a
username, our system inserts a randomly generated one. It is important to note that no
user-private information (e.g., a password) is inserted during this (or any other) step of
the dynamic stimulation of an app.
Touch button. Our system interacts with UI elements that are “clickable.” All clickable
objects found are prioritized based on their type (e.g., buttons have higher priority than
text fields) and their content; this allows us to, for example, touch an “OK” button before
a “Cancel” button.
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Pseudo-random touch events. If none of the previously mentioned actions can be per-
formed on a state, our system will try to explore the app’s behavior by simply randomly
clicking on its UI. This situation usually happens, when the application uses custom UI
elements, which do not export standard layout information to the OS.
In addition, if the analyzed app loses its focus (e.g., a window is opened in the system
browser), we perform appropriate actions to make the analyzed app regain focus.
3.3.5 App States Extraction and Comparison
In order to make meaningful comparisons of different executions, we need a way to
collect the current state of an app (e.g., which content it is showing to the user) at
different times during our analysis and compare those states. The way in which states
are encoded and compared needs to be sufficiently informative to capture significant
behavioral changes, but also flexible enough to help ignore minor changes unrelated to
the app’s functionality. Specifically, the behavior of an app is encoded as a trace of states,
which are then compared, looking for evidence of vulnerable authentication schemes.
State Extraction. Every five seconds, the system checks if the current device’s UI is
in a steady state. By this, we mean a situation in which the UI is likely not to change if
no action is performed. If so, we record the current app’s state (as better defined below)
and we perform an action. Otherwise, the system waits up to a maximum threshold
of 30 seconds. We employ this approach to perform actions and capturing states only
when the effects of previous actions on the app’s UI are completed. This also allows
the sample rate of our system to be dynamic, and it helps to ensure that the captured
states make the most sense when compared later. We use information provided by the
Android video and input subsystems to know when an animation is being rendered (and
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therefore the current state is not steady). However, if we are unable to reach a steady
state (e.g., the app uses OpenGL, or is otherwise constantly animating), we resort to an
image-comparison approach.
Once the UI is steady, the system records a state, consisting of the following:
• The activity name (in Android, an Activity is a specific UI window)
• A hash of the simplified UI layout data
• A perceptual hash of the device’s screen-shot
Hash of simplified UI layout data. To hash the information about the UI elements,
we make important simplifications to the UI data, so that it is more easily comparable. In
particular, from the layout tree describing the UI state, we remove the information about
the location of the different layout’s components and the text shown. These positioning or
text differences are oftentimes due to intrinsically non-deterministic or rapidly changing
UI elements, which are not relevant to our analysis.
Additionally, we take steps to avoid comparing deliberately dynamic content, espe-
cially advertising and web content. Advertising on Android is difficult to locate through
explicit UI information. However, most mobile advertising is standardized by the Interna-
tional Advertising Bureau [42], which dictates specific pixel dimensions for ads, therefore
we filter out elements from the simplified layout that have these sizes. Furthermore, we
also filter out all WebView objects, since dynamic web content is typically a significant
source of non-determinism. Lastly, we use the MD5 algorithm to condense the state
information.
Hash of device’s screen-shot. To hash the image acquired during the screen-shot, we
use the algorithm called average hash provided by the ImageHash Python library [43].
This algorithm was chosen to provide meaningful fuzziness for images, abstracting away
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small, unimportant differences, such as constantly-animating UI elements. Specifically,
this algorithm compresses every image in a 64-bit locality-sensitive fuzzy hash. The
algorithm is designed so that images “appearing” as similar for humans are hashed to
the same value, regardless of small graphical differences they may have.
State Comparison. We consider two states as equal if all the 3 components described
above are equal. Moreover, when comparing states in traces collected during Step 2
against the Invariant, we also consider two states as equal if their image hashes only
differ slightly (less than 10% of the bits composing the image hash). This threshold was
determined empirically, by taking a subset of the apps from our dataset, and manually
determining the optimal value.
Additionally, if during the dynamic stimulation of an app the device receives an SMS
or a phone call, we add special states to the trace.
3.4 Experimental Results
3.4.1 Datasets
We used the vulnerability detection system to probe apps from two different datasets:
“Top Free” dataset. A dataset of 606 apps containing all the most popular available
free Android apps. To generate this dataset, we first downloaded all the 539 available apps
listed in the “Top Free” category on the Google Play market. Then we supplemented this
set with other 67 applications starting from the ones that have the highest cumulative
number of installations.
“Top Grossing” dataset. A dataset containing the 394 most popular free apps in the
“Top Grossing” category on the Google Play market (excluding the ones already present
in the “Top Free” dataset). We chose this specific category because experimental results
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on the “Top Free” dataset and previous executions of our experiment revealed that apps
from this category often allow users to authenticate using non-secure methods to ease
their adoption.
Apps from both datasets were downloaded in January 2016. These datasets constitute
a heterogeneous corpus of very popular applications both in terms of installations and
developers’ revenue. In total, we analyzed 1,000 distinct apps.
3.4.2 Experimental Setup
Our system is implemented using a series of Nexus 5 handsets tethered to a controlling
PC. Specifically, we used 3 phones during the Invariant Generation and Vulnerability
Detection phases (Step 1 and Step 2) and 3 additional phones during Step 3. All handsets
run Google’s official Android 4.4.4 images (the most adopted Android version at the time
the apps were downloaded [44]).
During the collection of every trace of our analysis, we dynamically stimulated an
app for two minutes. To ease the deployment of our infrastructure, devices’ identifiers
and phone numbers were modified during different runs of the experiment, effectively
simulating the usage of a new device every time the experiment was run.
Averagely, the experiment needed 458 seconds per app to run Step 1 and Step 2 (in-
cluding time necessary to reboot a device and install an application). For apps flagged as
potentially vulnerable after these two steps, the analysis required, in average, additional
223 seconds per app to run Step 3 (including the time necessary to transfer the device’s
identity).
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3.4.3 Results
Our system flagged 50 apps as vulnerable in our corpus of 1,000 distinct apps. Using
manual analysis, we verified that 41 out of the 50 detected apps were actually vulnerable
to the identity-transfer attack. Among these, two apps are Viber and WhatsApp, two
very popular messaging apps with hundreds of millions of installations. We postpone the
discussion of the vulnerabilities identified in these two apps to Section 3.5.1. Another
group of 38 apps is composed by popular games, in which an attacker can perform an
identity-transfer attack to steal the victim’s virtual currency or objects. We will provide
more details about them in Section 3.5.2.
Another detected app authenticates users by using standard SMS authentication.
Specifically, this app identifies users with their phone number, by sending an authenti-
cation code to their phone number using an SMS, which is then automatically read by
the app. If this code is stolen, an attacker can login and control all aspects of the user’s
account.
This security issue is different from the one found in the messaging apps described
in Section 3.5.1, as it needs the attacker to steal the content of an SMS received by the
victim. However, it still falls into our threat model, since the SMS content is device-public
information.
In other 7 detected apps, we were able to transfer an identity with the exploit, but
the identity was not protecting anything sensitive. Our system cannot, of course, detect
which content is truly sensitive (e.g., related to a user’s account) to a particular app, but
the differences in the UI were present.
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For example, in one app, the device-public information was used to track whether
a user had accepted the application’s End-User License Agreement (EULA), and, in
another one, whether the user configured application preferences. In the other 4 apps,
the backend uses this information to track whether a user has viewed certain full-screen
“special offers” or advertisement from the app’s developer.
In addition, we found an app that, on first usage, shows a sign-in interface, since it
assumes that the user does not already have an account. However, on subsequent re-
installations, this app shows a username and password login interface, because it infers,
using device-public information, that a returning user would already have an account.
While not allowing any sort of account compromise, this information can still be leveraged
by any other app to infer valuable information about the user, as explored in [45].
Finally, 2 additional apps were detected because of problems of our testing infras-
tructure, such as connectivity issues of the apps that caused the appearance of different
graphical elements between the first installation and the subsequent ones. Subsequent
runs of our experiment on these samples confirmed that these apps were detected for
temporary problems. We consider these two apps as false positives.
3.5 Case Studies
3.5.1 Messaging Applications
Two of the detected applications are the very popular messaging apps, WhatsApp
and Viber, which allow users to send and receive text messages, VOIP calls, and media.
While the statistics on the Google Play market are not precise, WhatsApp is estimated
to have more than 1 billion installations and Viber has more than 500 million.
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Figure 3.2: Examples of states recorded during the Invariant Generation phase
(Step 1). Since these states were not present during Step 2 and Step 3 of our analy-
sis, our system correctly classified these apps as vulnerable. In the left example, the
skipped state shows to the user an introductory tutorial of the game. In the right one,
the skipped state asks the user to confirm the entered phone number before validating
it.
Our vulnerability detection system flagged WhatsApp as vulnerable, since it detected,
in the Vulnerability Detection and Exploit Verification phases, the absence of the “confirm
your phone number” interface (shown in Figure 3.2), and the missing reception of an
incoming SMS, used for authentication. Similarly, while analyzing Viber, the system
detected this app as vulnerable because of the missing “Enter Your Name” dialog (shown
only to new users) and the missing reception of a phone call whose part of the caller
number is used as an authentication token.
Initially, we speculated that those apps were detected as vulnerable because they
use the user’s phone number, verified using received SMS or incoming phone calls, as
their authentication method. This authentication method is common among popular
messaging apps, and we consider it as vulnerable in our threat model. In fact, an attacker
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with a malicious application installed on the victim’s device can pretend to own the
victim’s phone number and verify it by sending the authentication SMS received (or the
caller phone number) from the victim’s device to an attacker-controlled device.
However, further analysis surprisingly revealed that an even simpler attack is possible
against these apps. The identity-transfer attack was successfully performed for both apps
even though their backend did not send any SMS or phone call. This was possible because
these apps used the content of a hidden file stored in the external storage to authenticate
users upon re-installation.
Therefore, in the version of the apps we have analyzed, an attacker controlling an app
on the victim’s device could authenticate to the remote backend on behalf of the victim
by:
1. Copying the content of a specific file (stored in the external storage of the victim’s
device) to an attacker-controlled device.
2. In case of WhatsApp, spoof the value of the Google email account. To achieve
this, an attacker can use a malicious controlled app on the victim’s device to query
the AccountManager API and exfiltrate its value to an attacker-controlled device.
Then, on the controlled device, the attacker can spoof it by using, for instance,
the Xposed framework (as we implemented in the “ID Injector,” explained in Sec-
tion 3.2.3).
3. Open the app.
4. When asked to insert a phone number, specify the victim’s one.
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After these operations, the vulnerable app running on the attacker’s device is auto-
matically logged in as the victim, without even having the victim’s device receiving an
authentication text message. This exploit gives attackers full use of the victim’s account,
allowing them to send messages on the victim’s behalf, and to receive all future messages
sent to the victim.
Vendor Reaction. Upon discovery of these vulnerabilities, we contacted both vendors
in August 2015. Both vulnerabilities were quickly acknowledged and, after working with
the vendors, mitigations were deployed.
Specifically, both WhatsApp and Viber removed reliance on static identifiers and
publicly-accessible files. However, they still rely on the content of a received text message
(or, in case of Viber, the caller’s number of an authentication phone call) for their primary
means of authentication.
Interestingly, after our first notification, Viber was initially changed in a way that was
ineffective against our attack. In particular, the file in the external storage remained, but
just spoofing it was not enough. We discovered that Viber was changed to also check that
other device’s identifiers matched the ones used during a previous registration. However,
an attacker could just query the values of the different device identifiers using an attacker-
controlled app on the victim’s device (see Section 3.2.2) and then spoof them on an
attacker-controlled device, as implemented in the “ID Injector” (see Section 3.2.3). We
note that this attack was working until Viber issued another update, in September 2017,
removing reliance on the content of publicly-accessible files to perform authentication.
In addition, after our notification to the vendors (but likely independently from our
disclosure), in 2016 both apps implemented new cryptographic measures limiting an
attacker’s ability to impersonate a user when an account is stolen (via ours or other
attacks). In particular, both apps implemented an end-to-end encryption mechanism,
based on the usage of a per-user key pair. This functionality allows users to authenticate
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and encrypt exchanged messages. For instance, suppose that two users A and B com-
municate together. This system encrypts the communication channel between A and B
using their keys. Moreover, a user, for instance A, can check the value of B’s public key
and, in case B’s public key changes, A would be notified (however, A and B could still
communicate together). The same notification would be shown after the aforementioned
attack is performed because the per-user key is stored in an app-private location, so it
cannot be stolen and transferred to the attacker-controlled device.
3.5.2 Free-to-play Games
The other 38 identified vulnerable applications are games, in which an attacker can
perform an identity-transfer attack to, steal the victim’s virtual currency or in-game
objects. In these apps, the system detected, for instance, the fact that graphical inter-
faces used to enter the user’s name, or to show game tutorials and welcome messages
were skipped during the Vulnerability Detection and Exploit Verification phases (see Fig-
ure 3.2). This indicated that the app authenticated with the remote backend and was
able to obtain the user’s state.
After an identity-transfer attack was performed, we noticed three different kinds of
behaviors on the victim’s device, when attacked while the victim is using them. Some of
the apps show to the user a generic error message after the attack, such as “Connection
Timeout.” Others show a message informing the users that “another device” accessed
their account. Finally, some of them do not show any information to the victim.
All these games offer in-app purchases, and the virtual currency used is derived from
real money, using the Google’s In-App billing API (IAB). For this reason, these vulner-
abilities are particularly worrisome, since they can represent actual financial loss to the
97
Trusting the Operating System for Remote Authentication Chapter 3
victims and the apps’ developers. One surprising result was that the account transferred
during the Exploit Verification phase can include virtual currency purchased through
Google’s In-App Billing API [46].
Notably, this is not an explicit attack against the In-App Billing API, as explored in
previous work [47], but rather that its use in conjunction with the discovered vulnerabil-
ities makes this data vulnerable as well. This is due to how the IAB API is implemented
and how it is typically used by developers. In particular, even though the IAB mechanism
offers to store information about a user’s purchases (in a way which is secure under our
threat model), it cannot be easily used as a store of the user’s current account balance,
since precise accounting is not possible.
Therefore, developers need to store the virtual currency balance differently, in the
(potentially unsafe) app’s backend. In case of applications vulnerable to identity-transfer
attacks, this means the user’s paid-for currency is as easy to steal as any other information
in the user’s account. This is particularly of concern, given the already-established trend
in malware on other platforms targeting online game accounts [48].
3.6 Proposed Defenses
We propose two defenses against the attack studied in this work: one aimed at creating
secure device identifiers, and another aimed at safeguarding SMS-based authentication.
A fully working prototype implementation of our defenses is publicly available [49], as
an Xposed framework’s module.
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3.6.1 Securing the SMS Channel
Design. All installed apps on a device (that request the proper permission) can request
to be notified of the content of incoming SMS messages, even when these messages are
only intended for use by a particular app. As we shown, this behavior is particularly
problematic when received SMS messages contain authentication codes destined for only
a particular app.
Our proposed solution, similar to one discussed in [50], works by delivering au-
thentication SMS only to the apps intended to receive them. Specifically, we propose
a convention that authentication-related SMS should be pre-pended with the string
AUTHCODE: app cert fingerprint, where app cert fingerprint is the fingerprint of the
certificate used to sign the destination app. The OS would then route the message only
to the main SMS reader app, and the app bearing the included fingerprint. This improves
on Mulliner et al.’s previous solution by not requiring the OS to be notified ahead of time
about how incoming messages should be routed.
For example, consider an app named “Foo Messaging” signed with a certificate whose
fingerprint is 0d5af23c. In this case, users enter their phone number into the app, which
is sent to the app’s backend. As a response, the app’s backend sends an SMS message
with the content AUTHCODE: 0d5af238c Verification Code: 34782. When received, the
OS would then only notify the user’s default SMS reader and “Foo Messaging” about
the new message.
To improve usability, we propose that the default messaging app, by default, hides this
routing information. Alternatively, the default messaging app could replace it with an
indication of the app the message was delivered to. This functionality can be implemented
without any modification to existing apps. However, it would require a small modification
to the app’s backends to prepend the app’s fingerprint to the outgoing SMS.
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We note that the recently-released Android version 8 introduces a new API called
createAppSpecificSmsToken. This API “creates a single use app specific incoming SMS
request for the calling package” [51]. When using this API, an app would first get a secret
token from the operating system. Then the app’s backend would send an SMS containing
that specific token to the user’s device and the SMS will be subsequently automatically
routed by the OS to the correct app (through the token) and it will not be made readable
by any other apps (or visible by the user).
While it may seem that this new feature mitigates the weakness of the usage of SMS
to authenticate user, we argue that, on the contrary, it eases the attack we have described
in this chapter. In fact, while the usage of this API would stop an attacker from stealing
and replaying authentication codes when the user attempts to authenticate, the attacker
can just attempt their own authentication (simulating a user re-installing the app on
the same device), at which point the SMS will be sent and routed to the attacker’s app
and it can thus be easily stolen. From the conceptual point of view, the attack works
because the app’s backend does not have enough information to determine whether the
app receiving the SMS is the legitimate app or the attacker’s app.
There are two additional aspects that make apps using this new API more vulnerable
to the attacks presented. First, neither the user nor the legitimate app will notice the
incoming SMS message (triggered by the attacker), since it will be routed only to the
attacker’s app. Second, the attacker’s app does not need to require the READ SMS
permission when receiving messages using this API, thus making this malicious app
stealthier.
Implementation. There are two ways an app can access SMS in Android: an app can
ask to the operating system to be notified when a new message is received, or an app
can access the list of received messages. Thus, to implement our defense, we modified
both the Android InboundSmsHandler component, responsible to notify apps of incoming
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messages, and the SmsProvider component, mediating apps’ accesses to received SMS.
Globally, our modifications consist of approximately 100 LOC added to the original
Android code. The added code introduces an average slowdown of 5.381ms every time
an SMS is received and a slowdown of 2.064ms every time an app queries the operating
system for received SMS. We consider both slowdowns as negligible, given the fact that,
receiving a text message it is not a frequent event.
3.6.2 Secure Device IDs
Design. The most common and easily obtained device-public identifier is the AN-
DROID ID, which is intended to be used to allow apps and their backends to differentiate
Android devices.
In our defense we modify the API used to access the ANDROID ID, so that it returns
a Private Device ID (PDID) different for every app (more precisely, different for every
app’s signing certificate), instead of the original device-wide value. Specifically, the first
time a device boots (or after a factory reset) a random Secret ID (SID) is generated. The
Private Device ID is then derived from the Secret ID using the signing certificate included
with each app, which uniquely identifies its developer. In this way, the semantics of the
ANDROID ID are preserved, apps from different developers cannot steal each other’s
identifiers, but no convenience is lost for a developer with multiple apps on the same
device. Moreover, the PDID does not change after app’s re-installation.
Specifically, the PDID is computed as follows:
HMAC(SID, caller app cert fingerprint) where: caller app cert fingerprint is
the certificate fingerprint of the app calling the API and HMAC is a cryptographically
secure keyed-hash message authentication code (e.g., HMAC-SHA256) in which SID is
used as “key” and caller app cert fingerprint as “message.”
101
Trusting the Operating System for Remote Authentication Chapter 3
The security of this method is bolstered by the fact that
1. Upon installation, Android verifies that an app has been correctly signed.
2. The operating system can securely identify the caller of a framework API [52].
3. No API is provided to get the value of SID.
For these reasons, as long as the developer’s private key remains uncompromised, the
privacy of the PDID to an app is maintained.
We implemented this modification as complete transparent replacement of the current
API used to get the ANDROID ID. In this way this defense could be deployed without
requiring code changes to existing apps. This will necessarily interfere with advertising
libraries, which seek to use the ANDROID ID to track the usage of multiple apps on the
same device. However, as explained in Section 3.2.2, the only identifier that advertisement
libraries are supposed to use to track users is the Google Advertisement ID. A possible
alternative implementation would be providing the PDID to apps trough a separate API.
It is interesting to note that, concurrently (and independently) to the development of
this work, Google changed the behavior of the ANDROID ID to follow our proposed mod-
ification. Although the implementation details differ, the functionality achieved by this
change is the same. This modification is available starting from Android version 8 [53].
Implementation. We implemented this defense by modifying the Android Set-
tingsProvider, the operating system component responsible to deliver the ANDROID ID
value to the running apps. Our modifications consist of approximately 70 LOC added to
the original Android code. The added code introduces an average slowdown of 1.497ms
when the API to get the ANDRODID ID is called. The standard Android API caches this
value after the first time an app access it, thus we consider this slowdown as negligible.
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3.7 Limitations and Future Work
While we were able to find a surprising number of vulnerable apps, our system is far
from perfect. There are a few conceptual ways in which our system might miss vulnerable
apps. The most important one is the inability to influence a change in the user’s state
stored by the app’s backend server. For instance, in some games, the dynamic analysis
system would need to effectively play the game and, for example, score points or spend
virtual currency.
An important source of error in dynamic analysis is the non-determinism inherent in
today’s operating systems and apps. Some apps explicitly perform random behaviors,
which our Invariant Generation step attempts to remove, but it is by no means perfect.
For example, if the non-deterministic behaviors are time-dependent or influenced by
network delays, they may produce the same result during the Invariant generation, but
not during the other phases. Some previous work has been done to try to have fully
deterministic replay of actions (see Section 5.3), but the current state-of-the-art does not
handle all the source of indeterminism that our system has to deal with.
One other source of future improvement is in the number of identifiers spoofed and
transferred by our system. We used a large set of known identifiers for which we could
locate Android APIs, but apps could conceivably invent their own identifiers based on
collections of obscure system properties, or implement other means of fingerprinting
devices. Finding all possible ways this can happen is an open problem.
We would also like to explore the use of network traffic as part of the Invariant gen-
eration, to attempt to more precisely determine when a backend is saving and retrieving
user state. In particular, a way to assist with the network traffic analysis, as well as other
data sources and sinks, is to use a taint-tracking-based analysis system, such as Taint-
Droid [54]. Unfortunately, we have noticed that many identifiers are sent to the app’s
103
Trusting the Operating System for Remote Authentication Chapter 3
backend, even if they are not directly used for authentication purposes, which represents
a significant source of noise for this kind of analysis. This is potentially done to aid in
gathering metrics about apps, or to aid in advertising.
Finally, an interesting future work would be to study if the authentication problems
we have identified in this work also affect applications running in other mobile operating
systems.
3.8 Conclusions
In this work, we explored the real-world vulnerabilities of apps that authenticate their
users using device-public information. Some app authors appear to make the assumption
that this information is somehow hard to obtain or spoof.
To disprove this, first we developed an “identity-transfer” attack that can be auto-
matically applied to any apps relying on device-public information to authenticate its
users. Then, we developed a system, based on dynamic analysis, that infers informa-
tion about the apps’ backend states to locate insecure authentication mechanisms, and
perform our attack against them. After analyzing 1,000 popular apps from the Google
Play market, we found 41 that were vulnerable to our generic identity-transfer attack,
including two major messaging apps used with hundreds of millions of installations.
Finally we proposed and implemented solutions to the identified problems, requiring
minimal modifications to the Android operating system and no modifications to the
existing apps.
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Hardware-Assisted Authentication
As smartphones become widely used, more and more security-sensitive tasks are per-
formed using these devices. For instance, mobile payment or mobile banking applica-
tions have been steadily increasing for the past few years [55]. That is, smartphones
are increasingly used to access remote accounts containing valuable and sensitive user
information such as purchase histories or health data. Needless to say, the security of
smartphones and mobile apps, including authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality, is of
paramount importance.
Smartphone technologies bring both new opportunities and threats to security. A
smartphone is a very convenient choice to be the “second factor” in two-factor authenti-
cations (2FA) because the users do not have to carry additional security tokens. A very
common two-factor scheme is to authenticate a user based on both the user’s password
and proof that the user is in possession of her smartphone, with the latter commonly
achieved by sending text messages to the registered smartphone. On the other hand, as
more and more sensitive operations that are protected by 2FA are performed using smart-
phones, the security threat from a stolen/compromised phone or malicious apps running
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on the phone significantly increases. In particular, by performing sensitive operations on
smartphones, both factors required by 2FA will be available on the smartphone, making
it a single point of failure.
In theory, technologies commonly available on modern smartphones can be used to
implement 2FA schemes that are secure even in the face of stolen/compromised phones
or malicious apps running on the phone. In particular, most smartphones already come
with Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) that can be used to generate and store
cryptographic keys.1 Furthermore, the TEE can already be programmed to directly
communicate with a fingerprint reader (which is widely available on modern smartphones)
so that it will only perform operations using the stored keys when the fingerprint reader
detects a registered fingerprint, signaling the user’s explicit consent to such operations.
Since the TEE is a hardware-enforced isolated execution environment, the keys it stores
and the operations performed with those keys cannot be leaked or misused even if the
smartphone’s operating system (OS) is compromised.2
A second factor implemented by combining the TEE and the fingerprint reader is at
least as strong as what proposed in the Security Key protocol [58] (and implemented by
YubiKey [59]), the current state-of-the-art authentication solution in the desktop world,
promoted by Google, as a member of the FIDO Alliance [60]. Under the Security Key
protocol, a cryptographic private key is stored on an external hardware device and is
used to sign authentication tokens provided by the remote service the user wants to
authenticate with. This signing operation only happens if the user authorizes it, by
pressing a physical button on the external hardware device. In fact, one can argue that
1In devices running Android, the TEE is typically enforced by using the ARM TrustZone technol-
ogy [56].
2As an empirical measure, among all the vulnerabilities mentioned in the “Security Bulletins” released
by Google about Android security [57] up to August 2017, 33 of them allow an attacker “to execute
arbitrary code within the context of the kernel,” whereas only 2 allow “to execute arbitrary code in the
TrustZone context.”
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a second factor that combines a smartphone’s TEE and its fingerprint reader is going to
provide more security than YubiKeys in the scenario where the hardware security token is
stolen; in the former, the attacker cannot misuse the hardware token without the owner’s
fingerprint, while in the latter, anybody in possession of the token can misuse it to bypass
2FA. Additionally, the device’s screen (which is not present in standard hardware tokens),
could be used to inform users about the operation they are authorizing by touching the
sensor.
Motivated by the significant security benefits that the TEE-backed fingerprint sensor
can offer, in this work we perform the first comprehensive study on the usage of the
fingerprint API in Android. In particular, we first systematically explore the various
nuances of this API, and we uncover several aspects, many of which subtle, that can lead
to this complex API to be misused. As an example, developers could just check if the
user touched the sensor, without binding this operation to the usage of a cryptographic
key, contrary to what is suggested by Google’s guidelines [61].
We then bring some clarity to the many threat models that should be considered when
performing security evaluations concerning the fingerprint API. For example, we explore
what are the capabilities of an attacker that can compromise the untrusted operating
system, i.e., a “root attacker.” At first glance, one may say that a root attacker will
trivially defeat any fingerprint API and that the fingerprint API itself is not designed
to protect from root attackers. On the contrary, we argue that many important design
choices related to this API are motivated specifically to protect from root attackers. The
most significant example is that current implementations of the fingerprint API work by
unlocking a TEE-backed cryptographic keystore: if the threat model were not considering
root attackers, apps could simply store cryptographic material in app-private storage
(that non-root attackers cannot access), without needing to rely on any TEE support.
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We hypothesized that the lack of clearly stated design goals and, as we will see,
misleading documentation bring confusion and app developers might misuse this API.
To explore this hypothesis, we first developed a static analysis approach to characterize
how Android apps use the fingerprint API, whether this API is misused, and how they
are resilient to the various threat models. We then use this system to perform the first
systematic empirical study of how the current fingerprint API is used in the Android
ecosystem. Specifically, we used our tool to analyze 501 apps requiring the fingerprint
permission (out of a dataset of 30,459 popular apps). The results are worrisome. For
example, the tool identified that 53.69% of the apps, including the widely deployed Google
Play Store app, do not make use of the cryptographic keystore unlocked by a successful
fingerprint touch: this means that a root attacker can easily completely bypass the
fingerprint security mechanism by just programmatically “simulating” the user’s touch
to, for example, perform in-app purchases.
One explanation for this low percentage could be that not all use case scenarios for
the fingerprint API can be protected from root attackers. One example is an app that
uses the fingerprint to merely assess user presence: in this case, it is very challenging to
find a “role” for the cryptographic material, and it is thus not possible to protect this
use case from root attackers. To determine how many apps fall into this category, we
then performed manual analysis on a subset of applications flagged as problematic. For
example, we manually analyzed a random subset of 20 apps for which our tool identify
usages of the fingerprint API flagged as “fully bypassable.” To our surprise, 16 of them
are apps that use the fingerprint API to authenticate the user against a remote backend,
or apps that store secret information: These are exactly the use case scenarios that a
proper usage of the fingerprint API could easily protect even from powerful attackers
such as root attackers. This manual analysis effort, even though admittedly limited,
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suggests that the number of apps misusing the fingerprint API is significant. Moreover,
our tool also flagged only the 1.80% of the apps in our dataset as using the fingerprint
API to sign transactions, which is the most secure way to use this API.
In summary, this work makes the following contributions:
• We systematically study the various ways in which the fingerprint API can be used
in Android and how attackers with different capabilities can exploit sub-optimal
usages of it.
• We develop a static-analysis tool to automatically identify how real-world popular
apps use the fingerprint API. We make its code publicly available online [62].
• By using this tool, we perform the first systematic study of the usage of the fin-
gerprint API in Android, and we uncover a significant number of apps potentially
misusing the fingerprint API. This improper usage significantly weakens the secu-
rity guarantees these apps could achieve if using the API correctly.
• We identify shortcomings and weaknesses of the current API and its implementa-
tion, and we propose different improvements to it.
4.1 Background
4.1.1 Android Security Mechanisms
The Android operating system is a customized Linux kernel on top of which the
Android framework runs. User-installable third-party apps run as user-mode processes
and are typically written in Java, even though apps may also include libraries written
in native code. These apps interact with the Android framework using system calls or
invoking remote procedures in “system services.”
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Third-party apps run in separate containers with isolated resources (e.g., private
files) and a limited set of capabilities. The precise list of capabilities is determined by
the “Android permissions” granted to an app. In modern Android versions (starting
from Android 6), permissions classified as dangerous need to be specifically approved by
the user. Other permissions are instead automatically granted to any app that requires
them, but the app still needs to request them in its Manifest file. The USE FINGERPRINT
permission, which grants the ability to use the fingerprint reader sensor, is an example
of “normal” permission.
This separation between different apps and the different apps’ capabilities is enforced
by using a combination of standard Linux mechanisms (e.g., Linux groups), SELinux
rules, and specific checks in the Android framework. In fact, apps cannot perform any
sensitive operation directly, but they have to send a request to a running system service,
which verifies whether the app calling it has the permission required to perform the
requested operation. Thus, system services (which run as users with higher privilege
than normal apps) mediate most of the interactions between apps and the kernel.
Attackers often try to exploit bugs in either the system services or the kernel to
gain root privileges, using what are typically called “root exploits.” Although a signif-
icant effort has been made to limit the attack surface exposed by system services and
the kernel to normal apps [63], root exploits are still a concrete danger in the Android
ecosystem [57]. However, even when an attacker can fully compromise the Linux kernel,
achieving persistent kernel-level code execution (by bypassing the Verified Boot mecha-
nism) requires further exploitation of the system [64]. Similarly, achieving code execution
within the TrustZone-enforced TEE, which we describe in the next section, requires the
exploitation of significantly less common vulnerabilities in the relatively small code base
running within the TEE.
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4.1.2 TEE and TrustZone
A TEE is an isolated environment designed to execute sensitive code with more iso-
lation/protection than what provided by a standard “feature-rich” operating system.
While other instantiations of TEE exist, in this chapter, we will focus on ARM’s imple-
mentation of the TEE, called TrustZone, which is available on the majority of Android
devices.
Under ARM’s TrustZone, a “trusted” kernel and a set of Trusted Applications (TAs)
run in the “secure” world, isolated by hardware from the Android OS and third-party
apps, which, conversely, run in the “non-secure” world. Only code signed by the hardware
manufacturer can run in the “secure” world. Also, while third-party apps run in isolation
from the TAs, these apps can utilize services provided by the TAs through well-defined
APIs. Two services offered by the TAs are relevant to fingerprint-based authentication:
• keymaster: It allows to create cryptographic keys, store them inside secure-
storage, and use them to encrypt, decrypt, verify, or sign data, coming from the
untrusted world. Internally, this service utilizes the secure-storage capability of-
fered by the trusted kernel to securely store encrypted and authenticated data on
the device’s mass memory.
• fingerprintd: It handles the storage of fingerprint data, acquired from the finger-
print reader sensor, and verifies that the finger touching the sensor corresponds to
any previously registered fingerprint. It is important to notice that “raw” finger-
print data (i.e., the image of the registered fingerprint) never leaves the TEE and
therefore it is not accessible by any untrusted code.
111
Hardware-Assisted Authentication Chapter 4
4.1.3 The Fingerprint API in Android
In the discussions that follow, we will focus on apps that access the fingerprint reader
(which is commercially named the “Imprint” sensor) through the Java API provided
by Google. Unless otherwise specified, we will consider the implementation of this API
running in Android version 7 on Google’s devices. In particular, for our experiments we
used a Google’s Nexus 5X.
Also, we will follow Google’s [61] and OWASP [65] guidelines and consider that the
best way to use the fingerprint reader is in conjunction with some cryptographic op-
erations. In particular, instead of just recognizing the legitimate user has touched the
fingerprint sensor, an app should use this fingerprint reading to unlock a cryptographic
key protected by the TEE. In other words, by utilizing both the keymaster and the fin-
gerprint in the TrustZone, this method can guarantee that even an attacker with root
privilege cannot misuse the cryptographic key without presenting the right fingerprint.
As we will see in Section 4.4, the latter method is significantly stronger.
We will now briefly provide the major steps an app has to perform to interact with
the fingerprint sensor and determine whether a legitimate user touched it. For clarity, we
will omit unnecessary details of the complex Android cryptographic API, and we suggest
interested readers to read the official documentation for a more detailed explanation [66,
67].
Generate a cryptographic key: An app can generate a cryptographic key or a
public/private key pair by using the method initialize of the class KeyGenerator or
KeyPairGenerator. Developers must specify properties of the generated key (e.g., the
algorithm used) by passing a KeyGenParameterSpec object to the mentioned initialize
method.
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Among the various aspects a developer can control about a generated
key, the most important one in this context is triggered by calling the
setUserAuthenticationRequired method (passing true for its required parameter).
By calling this method, a developer can ensure that the generated key is usable (i.e., it
is “unlocked”) only after a legitimate user has touched the fingerprint reader sensor. In
case a pair of keys is generated, calling this method will only constraint the usage of the
private key, leaving the public one freely accessible by the app.
Unlock the key by authenticating the user: By calling the authenticate
method, an app activates the fingerprint reader sensor. Two parameters of this method
are important: the cryptographic key that is unlocked if a legitimate user touches the
sensor and a list of callback functions, called after the sensor is touched.
Override the fingerprint callbacks: When a user touches the sensor, specific
callback functions are called. In particular, the method onAuthenticationSucceeded
is called when a legitimate user touches the sensor, whereas other callback functions are
called in case of error conditions (e.g., a non-legitimate user touched the sensor).
Use the unlocked key: After the onAuthenticationSucceeded method is called,
an app should use the now unlocked key. For authentication purposes, Google’s guidelines
suggest the use of a previously generated private key to sign a server-provided authenti-
cation token and then send this authentication token to the app’s remote backend.
It is worth mentioning two properties of the generated keys. First, the Android
framework ensures that only the app generating a key can use it. Second, in modern
devices, private keys are stored within the TEE (an app can verify if in a specific device
keys are stored within the TEE by calling the isInsideSecurityHardware API) and
cannot be exported (not even by the app generating them and not even after a legitimate
user has touched the fingerprint sensor). In other words, “unlocking” a key does not
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allow an app to read its “raw” value, but only to use it to encrypt, decrypt, or sign data.
If the key is stored in the TEE, these operations are guaranteed to happen within the
TEE.
4.1.4 Two-Factor Authentication Schemes
To overcome security and usability limitations of classical username and password
authentication, many service providers suggest or mandate the usage of an additional
“second factor” during authentication. One common solution is to use a One-Time
Passcode (OTP). However, OTPs are still vulnerable to phishing and man-in-the-middle
attacks [68, 69] and have serious usability drawbacks, since they require the user to some-
how receive the OTP code and insert it into the authentication interface. Furthermore,
protocols based on OTPs rely on the confidentiality of the communication channel of the
OTP, which is often not guaranteed. For instance, text messages are a common com-
munication channel used to send OTPs to smartphones. However, the insecurity of this
channel has been shown in many occasions [70, 71].
Secure authentication schemes using challenge/response offer better security and us-
ability. In particular, the current state-of-the-art is constituted of the Security Keys for-
malized in the Universal Second Factor (U2F) protocol [72]. This protocol is composed
of two phases. During the registration phase, a key pair is generated in an external hard-
ware device. The generated public key is sent to the remote server, whereas the private
key remains securely stored within the hardware device. Later, during the authentication
phase, the server sends the client a challenge. The client then asks the hardware device
to sign this challenge with the stored private key, and the signed response is then sent
back to the remote server, which can verify it using the previously obtained public key.
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Both during the registration and the generation phases, the user is required to physically
touch the hardware device as a Test of User Presence (TUP) to authorize creation and
usage of cryptographic keys.
4.2 Threat Model
This section explores the different threat and attacker models considered in this chap-
ter. We first define different “levels of compromise” that an attacker may achieve. Then,
we discuss several different threat models, ranging from being just able to install a ma-
licious app on the victim’s device to be able to fully compromise the Android Linux
(untrusted) operating system. We will also argue why each of these threat models are
particularly relevant for any work studying the fingerprint API. We end this section by
clarifying which threat models are considered as out of scope.
4.2.1 Levels of Compromise
To ease our exposition, we now define three labels describing three different levels of
compromise an attacker can achieve in the different scenarios. We discuss the three levels
starting from the least powerful. We note that, of course, an attacker will always attempt
to achieve the third and most powerful level of compromise. However, depending on the
attacker capabilities and how a given app uses the fingerprint API, this may not always
be possible.
Confused Deputy. An attacker might be able to interfere with the usage of the fin-
gerprint API to change the intended effect a user wants to achieve when she touches the
fingerprint sensor. For example, consider a user who wants to authorize the transaction
“pay $1,000 to Friend” by pressing the fingerprint sensor: an attacker might be able to
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change this transaction to “pay $1,000 to Attacker.” Another example is an attacker that
can lure the user to provide the fingerprint by spoofing a completely unrelated scenario,
such as the lock screen.
More in general, these examples are instances of a confused deputy problem. An
attacker can achieve her goal by abusing this problem, but she needs the user to touch
the fingerprint sensor once for each malicious attempt.
Once For All. In this scenario, the attacker can completely bypass the need for “fin-
gerprint” by just luring the user to provide a fingerprint once. That is, after the attacker
obtains one fingerprint, the attacker can spoof any subsequent fingerprint request. We
note that, in this context, the term “spoofing” does not entail spoofing the “real” physical
fingerprint. Instead, with this term, we indicate that an attacker can trick the vulnera-
ble app, and the backend it communicates with, to believe a legitimate fingerprint was
provided.
As a representative example, consider an app that, after the user provides a finger-
print, decrypts, using a TEE-backed cryptographic key, an authentication token. If an
attacker manages to access this decrypted token, the attacker can now just reuse the
token undisturbed for subsequent authentication and authorization attempts, without
needing to lure additional fingerprints. Thus, this scenario provides a more practical
opportunity for an attacker.
Full Fingerprint Bypass. In this last case, an attacker can completely bypass the need
of luring fingerprint touches without requiring a “real” touch, not even once. For example,
consider a banking app that requires the user to confirm every monetary transaction by
pressing the fingerprint sensor. If an attacker can compromise the app to this last level,
the attacker can authorize an unlimited number of transactions, at will, without having
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the user touch the sensor. This case provides significant practicality benefits for an
attacker. In fact, the attacker does not need to “wait” to hijack a user’s touch: as a
matter of fact, in this scenario the attack does not need any user interaction at all.
We note that it may not always be possible for a root attacker to indefinitely wait for
a user’s touch, because, for instance, thanks to the Verified Boot protection mechanism,
it may be impossible to persistently compromise a device.
4.2.2 Attacker Capabilities
We consider the following three increasingly powerful attacker capabilities.
Non-Root Attacker. In this threat model, we consider an attacker that is just able
to install a malicious application on the victim’s device. In this case, we assume that
the attacker is unable to subvert the security of the operating system, and therefore the
installed malicious app is still constrained by all the limitations imposed by the Android
framework. The installed app can, however, request permissions (as any other benign
third-party app installed on the device) to obtain specific capabilities, and, in this case,
we assume that the user will grant them.
Additionally, the installed app, can show maliciously crafted messages or, more in
general, interfere with the device’s user interface (UI), to lure a legitimate user to touch
the fingerprint reader sensor. These UI attacks greatly vary in terms of complexity and
flexibility, and they are well explored by several existing works [73, 74, 1], some of which,
such as Cloak & Dagger [75], achieve almost complete compromise of the device. While
these attacks are indeed powerful, we note that the fingerprint API might be one of
the few aspects that could, at least in principle, prevent full compromise. In fact, even
though the Cloak & Dagger attack can simulate arbitrary user input, it cannot “spoof”
a physical fingerprint user’s touch.
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The key conceptual point here is that there is no trusted path from the fingerprint
API to the UI. Thus, as previous works have shown, the attacker can exploit an instance
of the confused deputy problem. We postpone the discussion on the practicality and
implications of these attacks to Section 4.5.2.
Root Attacker. In this threat model, we assume that an attacker can fully compromise
the Android operating system, by using, for instance, a “root exploit.” Therefore, the
attacker can completely bypass apps’ restrictions put in place by the Android framework.
For example, the attacker can access app-private storage (which is usually protected by
the sandboxing mechanism). Moreover, exploiting confused deputy instances via the UI
attacks mentioned above becomes much simpler for a root attacker.
Additionally, the attacker can spoof “messages” from the operating system: Specif-
ically, an attacker can freely communicate with the TEE, and thus send arbi-
trary messages to it. At this point the attacker can programmatically invoke the
onAuthenticationSucceeded method implemented within the victim app (and thus sim-
ulating a user’s touch), even if the user has never touched the fingerprint sensor.
We note that, although a root attacker is powerful, she does not get access to every-
thing. In particular, the fingerprint API enforces the following three security properties
even on a system in which the untrusted OS is completely compromised:
1. an attacker cannot retrieve “raw” fingerprint data;
2. an attacker cannot retrieve the value of cryptographic key stored into the TEE (i.e.,
keys are not exportable);
3. an attacker cannot use TEE-backed cryptographic keys, unless a legitimate user
touches the fingerprint sensor.
However, if the victim app does not properly use such TEE-backed cryptographic keys,
the attacker might be able to achieve her goal anyways, as we will explain later.
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That being said, we also note that, for some usage scenarios, an app does not have
any technical way to secure itself from root attackers. For example, if the app uses
fingerprint not to secure a secret or token, but as a local “Test of User Presence” (TUP),
there is currently no way a developer could make use of cryptographic algorithms. On
the other hand, crypto primitives can be definitively used when implementing remote
user-authentication mechanisms. We postpone the discussion about these scenarios to
Section 4.5.1.
Finally, for this threat model, we will assume that the device is not in a compromised
state when the cryptographic keys (“unlocked” by touching the fingerprint sensor) were
first created by the app that the attacker wants to compromise. The creation of cryp-
tographic keys typically happens only during the first usage of an app and, therefore, it
may be impossible for an attacker to interfere with their creation if the compromise of a
device happens only after this stage of an app’s lifecycle.
Root-at-Bootstrap Attacker. In this threat model, we consider an attacker with
the same capabilities of the previous one. Additionally, we also assume that the device
is in a compromised state even in the moment in which the victim’s app generates the
cryptographic keys. Therefore, in this case, the attacker can interfere with their creation.
4.2.3 Out-of-Scope Attacker Capabilities
We assume that the TEE is not compromised. In other words, we consider an attacker
that can compromise the code running (or the data stored) within the TEE as out of
scope. In fact, an attacker able to compromise the TEE can trivially fully compromise
the fingerprint functionality, by stealing all the cryptographic keys in the secure storage.
Moreover, as previously mentioned, exploits able to gain this capability for an attacker
are extremely rare.
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We will consider attacks on the physical recognition of the fingerprint as out of scope.
These attacks, although possible [76], deal with the physical aspects of the fingerprint
acquisition process and with the algorithms used to compare fingerprint data. Conversely,
in this chapter, we focus on a higher-level aspect: the operations inside TEE that are
triggered by the legitimate user touching the fingerprint sensor, the operating system, and
the apps using the fingerprint sensor API. Therefore, we will assume that the fingerprint
sensor and the code inside the TEE handling it are always able to understand if the user
that is touching the sensor is the legitimate one (i.e., a user who has previously registered
her fingerprint as valid using the appropriate operating system interface).
4.3 Fingerprint API usages
In this section, we will explain how the fingerprint API is used by Android apps. In
particular, we will classify apps’ usages of the fingerprint API based on if and how cryp-
tographic keys (stored inside the TEE) are used to verify that a legitimate user touched
the fingerprint sensor. This aspect has profound implications on what attackers can do
to subvert the fingerprint checks and how they can achieve their malicious goals. In Sec-
tion 4.5.1, we will then explain how the verification of the user touching the sensor is used
as a part of the authentication schemes implemented by apps and their corresponding
backends.
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4.3.1 Weak Usage
The easiest way to use the fingerprint API is to execute some code after a legitimate
user touched the sensor, without using any cryptography. To achieve this, a developer
just has to call the authenticate method to activate the fingerprint reader sensor and
override the onAuthenticationSucceeded method to be notified when the user touched
it.
From the implementation standpoint, recall that the authenticate method takes, as
an argument, the cryptographic key that is unlocked when the user touches the sensor
(see Section 4.1.3). Thus, an app can set this parameter to NULL and, as a side-effect,
the fingerprint will not unlock any cryptographic keystore. Of course, an app could
also require access to the keystore and it could then discard this object without using
it. In other words, a specific fingerprint-protected functionality is not “protected” by
cryptographic operations if a cryptographic key is unlocked but never properly used.
4.3.2 Decryption Usage
In this case, a cryptographic key is created, stored inside the TEE, and used to
decrypt (once the key is “unlocked” by a legitimate user touching the fingerprint sensor)
locally stored files. Google’s guidelines suggest using the fingerprint API in this way when
“securing access to databases or oﬄine files.” In practice, we have seen this method often
used to decrypt an authentication cookie stored in an encrypted vault within the app’s
private storage. This authentication cookie, typically valid for multiple sessions, can be
used by the app to authenticate with the remote server.
We have found two ways in which this mechanism is implemented. The easiest case
is when a symmetric key is created and used to encrypt/decrypt the content of the
“encrypted vault.” The disadvantage of this method is that it requires the user to touch
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the sensor (to “unlock” the key) to both read something from the vault and to write
something into it. As a consequence, if, for instance, the remote backend decides to
change the value of the authentication cookie stored inside the vault, the user would
need to touch the fingerprint sensor to unlock the key.
A more user-friendly way is to use an asymmetric key pair. In this case, the public
key (which does not need to be “unlocked” before usage), is used to write inside the
vault, and the private key (which requires the user’s touch) is only used to read from
the vault (e.g., when the stored authentication cookie is needed to authenticate with the
app’s backend).
Surprisingly, the example officially provided by Google [77] about using the fingerprint
API together with a symmetric key does not show how to use cryptography safely. In fact,
the provided code generates a symmetric key and, after the user touches the sensor, uses it
to encrypt a fixed, hardcoded string. Then, the code just checks whether the encryption
operation (performed using the doFinal API) threw an exception, an indication that
the used key is (still) locked (i.e., it has not been unlocked). While the intent might
have been to verify that the user has touched the sensor, this particular example code
makes the usage of cryptography pointless because an attacker with “root” privileges can
just fake the result of the decryption operation and clear the thrown exception (as we
will describe better in Section 4.7.1). In practice, in terms of security, we consider the
Google’s example on how to use symmetric keys as a case of Weak usage of the fingerprint
API, rather than a case of Decryption usage.
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4.3.3 Sign Usage
The fingerprint API can also be used to implement challenge/response authentication
schemes. This offers significantly more security over a wide range of attackers, but,
unfortunately, it is rarely used by developers.
In this case, typically during the app’s first usage, a key pair is generated: the public
key is sent to the app’s remote backend server, whereas the private one is stored within
the TEE. When the app needs to authenticate a user to the remote backend, the following
steps take place:
1. The remote backend sends a challenge to the app.
2. The app calls the authenticate API to “unlock” the previously stored private key.
3. The legitimate user touches the fingerprint reader sensor, and the private key is
“unlocked” by the TEE.
4. The onAuthenticationSucceeded method (overridden by the app) is called.
5. The app uses the now-unlocked private key to sign the challenge from the app’s
backend.
6. The app sends the signed challenge to the backend.
7. The backend verifies the signature on the challenge, using the public key previously
obtained from the client.
8. The backend communicates to the app the result of the verification and considers
the user as authenticated.
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4.3.4 Sign + Key Attestation Usage
As we discuss in more detail in Section 4.4.3, the “Sign” usage is vulnerable to an
attacker that can perform a man-in-the-middle attack at the app bootstrap time, when
the initial key exchange takes place. In this attack, the attacker would provide to the
backend her public key (for which she has the associated private key), and she could
then bypass the fingerprint. However, starting from Android 7, a countermeasure to this
attack is possible, since Android can provide an “attestation” certificate chain, attesting
that a key has been created by a “trusted” TEE. A similar attestation mechanism is
present in the Security Keys protocol [58].
To enable it, a developer, when creating a key pair, has to call the
setAttestationChallenge(attestationChallenge) API with a non-NULL value for
attestationChallenge. Then, the app can retrieve the certificate chain, attesting the
generated public key using the getCertificateChain API. The app’s backend can then
verify that the root of this chain is signed by a trustworthy Certificate Authority (typi-
cally Google). The certificate, among other pieces of information about properties of the
generated keys, contains the attestationChallenge previously set, allowing the app’s
backend to verify that the retrieved key was created as a consequence of a specific request.
4.4 Protocol Weaknesses and Attack Scenarios
We will now highlight the weaknesses of each usage scenarios described in Section 4.3.
For each identified weakness, we will also determine which classes of attacker (as defined
in Section 4.2) can exploit it. Our findings are summarized in Table 4.1.
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4.4.1 Weak Usage: Fake TEE response
In the Weak usage scenario, fingerprint-based authentication is considered successful
as long as the TEE communicates that a legitimate touch happened. This message is
delivered by the OS to the client app (by invoking the onAuthenticationSucceeded
method). In this case, any entity that can control/impersonate the OS to deliver such
message can successfully authenticate and authorize any transaction to the server, with-
out having to wait for the user to present the fingerprint even once. In other words,
any “root” attacker can achieve Full Fingerprint Bypass against Weak usage by faking
OS messages. Additionally, a non-root attacker can exploit confused deputy problems
by mounting UI attacks. Once again, these attacks are possible because of the lack of
trusted UI in Android. We also note that these attacks are possible independently from
the specific attacker capabilities and from the specific usage scenario. We refer the reader
to Section 4.5.2 for more details.
4.4.2 Decryption Usage: Replay Attack
In the Decryption usage scenario, the TEE is used to decrypt a value (e.g., an authen-
tication cookie), and the same value is communicated to the client app (and the backend
server) for every attempt to authenticate or authorize a transaction. In this scenario, an
attacker only needs to capture this value once to then be able to fully authenticate and
authorize any transaction any time in the future, by simply replaying this captured value
over and over.
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4.4.3 Sign Usage: Man-in-the-Middle Attack
In the Sign usage scenario, the TEE is used to protect a private key used in a chal-
lenge/response scheme. In this scenario, a root attacker cannot easily compromise the
system — in a way, she has similar capabilities as a non-root attacker, and she could
thus attempt to exploit confused deputy problems via UI attacks.
However, we note that an attacker can launch a man-in-the-middle attack if she can
interfere with the “app bootstrap” process, during the initial key exchange. The attack
would work in this way: at bootstrap, instead of sending to the backend server the real
key output by the TEE, the attacker can use her own key instead. In this way, the
attacker can use the key thus registered to answer any future challenge (because the
attacker knows both the public and the private key), thus achieving Full Fingerprint
Bypass. Clearly, since this attack requires the attacker to have control over when the key
exchange is carried out, it is only possible for Root-at-Bootstrap attackers.
4.4.4 Sign + Key Attestation Usage: Key Proxying
The “Sign + Key Attestation” usage scenario significantly raises the bar for attacks,
even for a very powerful attacker such as Root-at-Bootstrap attacker. However, from a
conceptual point of view, it is possible to attack this usage scenario as well, by performing
a so-called cuckoo attack [78]. Specifically, while this mechanism attests that a key has
been created by the TEE on a user’s device with the goal of preventing an attacker from
knowing its private value, it cannot prevent an attacker from “proxying” the app’s request
for creating a key pair to her attacker-controlled device and using the TEE of her device.
We note that this attack scenario presents serious practicality and scalability issues for
the attackers. That being said, we will further discuss this aspect in Section 4.8.3, where
we propose improvements on the current implementation of this mechanism.
126
Hardware-Assisted Authentication Chapter 4
Table 4.1: Summary of attack possibilities with respect to attacker capabilities and
fingerprint API usage.
Attacker Capabilities
Fingerprint API Usage
Weak Decryption Sign
Sign
+
Key Attestation
Non-Root C.D. 1 C.D. C.D. C.D.
Root Full Once C.D. C.D.
Root-at-Bootstrap Full Full Full C.D.
1 “C.D.” stands for Confused Deputy.
4.5 Discussion
This section discusses aspects related to the fingerprint API that are not strictly
related to the API itself or to the specific vulnerable “usage scenarios” described above.
4.5.1 Application Contexts
Typically, the fingerprint API is used as a part of an authentication scheme. In this
section, instead of focusing on how apps use the fingerprint sensor in terms of API calls
and encryption, we will discuss common functionality apps aim to accomplish when they
use the fingerprint sensor.
“Local-Only” Usage. Some apps use the fingerprint API to implement the “screen-
lock” functionality. For instance, they prevent access to a list of user-selectable apps,
unless the fingerprint sensor is touched by a legitimate user. In this case, the fingerprint
sensor just constitutes a local Test of User Presence (TUP).
For these apps, only a Weak usage of the fingerprint API is reasonable. In fact, the
app does not have any remote backend to authenticate with nor it stores any secret data.
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Remote User-Authentication. More interestingly, in many cases, the fingerprint API
is used as one part of an authentication scheme. Upon first usage, apps have to provide
a single-factor or multi-factor user authentication system, since no cryptographic key is
created and stored by the app inside the TEE yet. On subsequent usages, the app
(and the corresponding backend) may require the user to touch the fingerprint sensor.
Some apps can be configured to require the user to touch the sensor every time the
app is opened and it connects to the remote backend. Others ask for this action before
performing any sensitive operation, such as a payment.
Typically, when the fingerprint functionality is enabled, the app will allow the use
of a fingerprint touch instead of inserting the account’s password. While this is con-
venient in term of usability, it has mixed security consequences. As a security benefit,
an attacker achieving “root” cannot steal the account password, since the user is not
asked to insert it. However, as we will explain in Section 4.5.2, even a non-root attacker
can potentially lure a user to touch the fingerprint sensor and, compared to phishing a
password, stealing a fingerprint touch is significantly easier. In fact, touching the finger-
print sensor is a common action, since it is used, for instance, very frequently to unlock
the phone. Therefore an attacker can just pretend to be the lock-screen without raising
much suspicion. Secondly, a fingerprint touch requires less user’s effort and time to be
performed and therefore is more likely to happen. Finally, an attacker does not need to
ask for a specific password, but just to generically touch the sensor.
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4.5.2 Practicality and Impact of UI Attacks
As we mentioned earlier, a malicious app can show maliciously crafted messages or,
more in general, interfere with the device’s user interface to lure a legitimate user to
touch the fingerprint reader sensor. In particular, we mentioned how several existing
works [73, 74, 1] show the possibility to perform UI attacks, and that a very recent work,
dubbed Cloak & Dagger [75], can achieve almost complete compromise of the device.
In particular, this last work showed that apps installed from the Play Store are auto-
matically granted the SYSTEM ALERT WINDOW permission (which allows to create overlays
windows on top of any other) and that it is possible to lure the user to unknowingly
grant accessibility permissions to a malicious app through “clickjacking.”
These attacks are powerful, especially because they can be performed by any un-
privileged app (what we refer to as “non-root attacker”). However, we note that the
fingerprint API might be one of the few aspects that could, at least in principle, prevent
full compromise: a physical fingerprint “touch” cannot be spoof via UI-only attacks.
That being said, there are many attacks that one could perform. These attacks are
all instances of a confused deputy problem, and they are all possible due to one key
observation: no “Secure UI” is currently used by the fingerprint API, and the user does
not have any mechanism to establish with which app she is interacting with. As a very
practical example of these attacks, Zhang et al. [79] show how an attacker can create a
fake “screen lock” to lure the user to provide her fingerprint: the fingerprint, under the
hood, is actually “passed” to a security sensitive app in the background.
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More in general, the lack of “secure UI” allows an attacker (independently from
the fingerprint usage scenarios described in Section 4.3) to lure the user to present her
fingerprint believing she is authenticating with app A or authorizing transaction X,
while the fingerprint is actually used to unlock keys for a different app B or to authorize
transaction Y .
These attacks are affected by practicality aspects. First of all, an attacker needs to
solve two issues:
1. Put the victim app in a state in which, once the fingerprint sensor is touched, an
unwanted malicious action happens.
2. Lure a legitimate user to touch the sensor.
Second, the attacker needs to steal a fingerprint touch every single time she wants to
perform the attack. However, this last challenge can be easily addressed: since the
fingerprint is often used to perform “screen unlock” and since the “screen unlock” action
is an action that a user is used to perform tens of times every day, it is straightforward
for an app to create a situation for which the user would provide a fingerprint.
From a technical standpoint, an attacker can exploit this by simulating that a device
got automatically locked (which, by default, happens after a few seconds of non-usage).
To achieve this, the attacker can show a fullscreen, black overlay on top of any existing
Activity.3 Moreover, by requiring the permission WRITE SETTINGS, the attacker can also
minimize the background light of the screen. At this point, the attacker can prevent
the device from automatically locking itself (by using the WakeLock API, requiring the
automatically-granted WAKE LOCK permission). In this scenario, a user will likely assume
that the device got automatically locked and try to unlock it by touching the fingerprint
sensor.
3An Activity is the standard “unit of interaction” in Android and loosely corresponds to a window
in a desktop environment.
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As an attempt to defeat these UI attacks, a countermeasure is currently implemented
by the Android framework. Specifically, an app can only request the usage of the finger-
print sensor if it is displayed in the foreground. Unfortunately, in evaluating if an app
is in the foreground, the Android framework only evaluates its position in the Activity
stack. Since the Android framework does not deem screen overlays as part of the Activity
stack, an Activity will still be considered as in foreground, even when maliciously covered
by an overlay.
4.6 Automatic Analysis Tool
We have developed a tool to automatically analyze how an app uses the fingerprint
API. The tool takes an Android app as input and classifies its usage of the fingerprint API
into Weak , Decryption, and Sign usage, as defined in Section 4.3. We use the tool above
to perform the first systematic study on how Android applications use the fingerprint
sensor, pinpointing cases in which this API is incorrectly used. We believe app developers
and app market operators can also use this tool to automatically understand if there is
any issue in how an app uses the fingerprint API. Figure 4.1 provides an overview of the
developed tool.
4.6.1 Challenges and Design Choices
Our tool performs static analysis on an app’s bytecode. We choose static analysis
on bytecode to be able to perform our analysis without needing source code (which
is typically unavailable both to security researchers and market operators). Moreover,
many apps using the fingerprint API belong to the “finance” category. This makes very
difficult to automatically perform dynamic analysis on these apps, since we do not have
the required financial account information needed to get past the login stage. Even
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approaches able to automatically register accounts while performing dynamic analysis,
such as AppsPlayground [41], cannot solve this problem by automatically creating bank
(or other financially related) accounts. This aspect also significantly complicates our
manual investigation of the results and our attempts to dynamically execute a given app.
One of the main challenges when analyzing recent real-world Android apps is the
amount of code these applications include (on average, the apps we have analyzed have
about 51,000 methods). This is often because apps include big libraries, which, even if
only marginally used, substantially increase the amount of code a static-analysis tool may
end up analyzing. Empirically, recent research [80] has shown that even relatively easy
data-flow analysis, such as flow-insensitive taint analysis, often ends up using unpractical
amounts of resources and time, when applied to an entire app. However, for the analysis
we are interested in, we only need to precisely characterize the usage of very specific API
methods. For these reasons, we adopted a more localized approach, which constructs
call graph and data-flow graphs starting from the APIs of interest, limited to the specific
parameters we are interested in.
4.6.2 Pre-processing
The first step of our analysis is to determine which apps potentially use the fingerprint
API. Since, to use the fingerprint hardware, an app has to require the USE FINGERPRINT
permission, our tool first checks whether a given app requires this permission by reading
its manifest file. Apps not requesting this permission cannot use the fingerprint API.
After this step, we use the Java static analysis framework SOOT [81] to obtain an
intermediate representation of the app’s bytecode. To simplify further data-flow analysis,
we choose the Shimple intermediate representation, which is in single static assignment
(SSA) form.
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4.6.3 Call Graph Construction & Data Flow Analysis
Our analysis is based on two static analysis primitives: call graph generation and
data-flow graph analysis. The call graph represents method invocations among different
methods in the analyzed app. In building the call graph, we perform intra-procedural
type-inference [82] to determine the possible dynamic types of the object on which a
method is called. If this analysis fails, we over-approximate the possible dynamic types
as all the subclasses of its static type (including the static type itself).
Our call graph also considers some implicit control flow transitions introduced by the
Android framework [83]. In particular, when the onAuthenticationSucceeded callback
is invoked by the Android framework, typically developers call the postDelayed method,
by passing, as parameter, an instance of a specific inner-class, implementing the Runnable
interface. On this inner-class, the method run will be later called and executed in a
different thread. This is a common behavior in Android, since code dealing with UI
elements has to run in a different thread than code dealing with network operations, to
ensure app’s responsiveness.
Our tool handles these cases by identifying the possible dynamic types of the instance
passed to the postDelayed method. Then, it adds edges in the call graph between the
postDelayed method and the implementations of the run methods that can be possibly
called, according to the identified types (typically, just one).
To perform data-flow analysis, starting from a variable of interest V (e.g., a specific
parameter of an API call), we recursively follow the def-use chain to obtain an inter-
procedural backward slice. Moreover, when a field access is encountered, we continue the
analysis starting from all the instructions accessing it. As an output of this analysis, we
obtain a slice of instructions (encoded as a tree) in which each instruction uses variables
that may influence the value of V .
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Table 4.2: Overview of the collected features
authenticate Null/NonNull
onAuthenticationSucceeded NoCrypto/Constant/Decrypt/Signature
Key Properties
DecryptionKey/SigningKey
UnlockedKey/LockedKey
4.6.4 Feature Extraction
At a high-level, our analysis extracts three kinds of features:
1. how the authenticate API is used;
2. which code is triggered when the onAuthenticationSucceeded callback is called;
3. the parameters used to create cryptographic keys.
Table 4.2 enumerates the features we extract to characterize these three aspects.
authenticate API Usage. For the authenticate API, for each occurrence of a call to
this method, our analysis generates a backward slice, starting from the parameter named
crypto. This parameter is used to specify the cryptographic key that is “unlocked”
whenever a legitimate user touches the fingerprint sensor. Then, by analyzing the gen-
erated slice, we check if the value of this parameter is NULL. In this case, it means that
the authenticate API will activate the fingerprint sensor, but no key will be unlocked
when the user touches it. We mark this case as Null, otherwise we mark it as NonNull.
onAuthenticationSucceeded Callback Usage. We analyze the code that is executed
when the onAuthenticationSucceeded callback is invoked, to determine if and how
cryptographic operations happen after the user touched the fingerprint sensor. Starting
from each occurrence of a method overriding onAuthenticationSucceeded, we start a
forward exploration of the call graph, looking for calls to specific cryptographic methods.
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Specifically, if we encounter a call to the methods sign or update of the class
Signature, we mark this usage of onAuthenticationSucceeded as Signature, whereas
if we encounter a call to the methods doFinal or update of the class Cipher, we mark
it as Decrypt.
As a special case, if after the onAuthenticationSucceeded callback a decryption
operation is detected, but it is performed on a fixed, hardcoded string (as explained in
Section 4.3.2), we mark this case as Constant (instead of Decrypt). To determine this, we
generate a backward slice starting from the parameter specifying the decrypted content,
and we analyze it to determine if it results in a constant string.
In case we do not encounter any of the aforementioned cryptographic methods we
mark the usage of the onAuthenticationSucceeded callback as NoCrypto, since it shows
that no cryptographic operation is performed as a consequence of the user touching the
fingerprint sensor.
Cryptographic Key Properties. To determine the type of the used cryptographic
keys, we generate a backward slice starting from the purpose parameter of the
KeyGenParameterSpec.Builder constructor. In case we determine it to have the value
PURPOSE SIGN we mark the key as a SigningKey otherwise we mark it as a DecryptionKey.
We also verify if the setUserAuthenticationRequired method is invoked (by pass-
ing true for its required parameter). If this is the case, we mark the key as Locked,
otherwise, we mark it as Unlocked.
Other Features. To integrate the information collected by the features just
described, we also check if an app is using the getCertificateChain and
setAttestationChallenge APIs. While we do not use this information to classify how
an app uses the fingerprint API, we will use this information to study if apps use key
attestation (see Section 4.4.4 and Section 4.7.7).
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4.6.5 App Classification
After collecting the aforementioned features, we use them to classify how the analyzed
app uses the fingerprint API. The rationale behind this classification rules is first to
identify cases in which the fingerprint API is not used (e.g., no fingerprint-related API
is called) or used in a Weak way (e.g., no cryptographic operation is performed). Then,
we analyze the properties of the used cryptographic keys and the cryptographic methods
called to determine whether to classify the app as Decryption or Sign.
First of all, we note that for some of the analyzed apps that request the
USE FINGERPRINT permission, we cannot identify any usage of the authenticate API or
the onAuthenticationSucceeded callback. We classify these apps, together with those
not requesting the USE FINGERPRINT permission, as “Not Used.”
Then, we classify an app as Weak if any of the following conditions are met:
1. We do not detect any key generation (i.e., the KeyGenParameterSpec.Builder API
is never used).
2. All the usages of the authenticate API are marked as Null. This corresponds to
the case in which no cryptographic key is unlocked as a consequence of the user
touching the fingerprint sensor.
3. All the usages of the onAuthenticationSucceeded callback are marked as
NoCrypto or Constant. This corresponds to the case in which no cryptographic
operation is performed after the user touched the sensor (or the only cryptographic
operation happening is performed on a constant value).
4. An Unlocked key is used. In fact, in this case, the used key is not locked, and
any root attacker can immediately use it, without having the user touching the
fingerprint sensor.
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Table 4.3: Static analysis tool results summary
Total Apps Analysis Errors Not Used
501 5 (1.00%) 72 (14.37%)
Category Weak Decryption Sign
Detected apps 269 (53.69%) 146 (29.14%) 9 (1.80%)
Misclassifications 0/20 1/10 1/9
At this point, we know that some proper cryptographic operation happens after
the user touches the fingerprint sensor. To determine whether the app uses the fin-
gerprint API in a Decryption or in a Sign way, we use the following rule. We classify
an app as Sign if any key marked as SigningKey is generated and any usage of the
onAuthenticationSucceeded callback is marked as Signature. Otherwise, we classify
the app as Decryption.
4.7 Automatic Analysis Results
4.7.1 Evaluation Methodology
To determine the correctness of the classification of our tool, we employed the follow-
ing two-step methodology:
Driving the App to Ask for Fingerprint
In the first step of our evaluation, we manually drive the analyzed app to the point
where it starts communicating with the TEE for fingerprint-based authentication.
One significant challenge in this step is that most of the considered apps require
specific accounts to go beyond the initial login interface, and it is impractical to create
accounts for many such apps. This is because many of the apps we analyzed are mobile-
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banking apps, for which it is not possible having an account without also being customers
of the connected bank. In other cases, the app’s backend requires financial information
such as Social Security Numbers or debit card numbers to create an account, which
further hindered our ability to interact with these apps.
Verify the Existence of Expected Weaknesses
Once we drive the analyzed app to start interacting with the TEE, we verify our
tool’s classification for this app by simulating a root attacker and see if the fingerprint-
based authentication is vulnerable to weaknesses of the corresponding class as predicted
in Section 4.4. For simulating a root attacker, we used the Xposed Framework [37], a
tool which allows us to easily modify apps’ and framework’s Java code at runtime.
In particular, if our tool classifies the app as using the Weak usage, our sim-
ulated attack modifies the behavior of the authenticate API to directly call the
onAuthenticationSucceeded callback. Furthermore, we deal with the case in which
the victim app invokes any cryptographic operation using a key stored inside the TEE.
In this case, the app would raise an exception, since this key has not been “unlocked.”
This scenario may occur in the case in which the result of the decryption is not used
(and therefore we classify the app as Weak), but still, a TEE-protected key is used to
decrypt a hardcoded string, as it happens, for instance, in the Google’s sample code [77].
We deal with this case, by masking the generated “User Not Authenticated” exception.
For apps classified as using the fingerprint API in a Decryption way, we first record the
outputs of decryption operations using TEE-protected keys (simulating a Root attacker).
Then, we modify the authenticate API as explained before and, additionally, we replay
the collected decryption outputs when necessary.
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4.7.2 Dataset
We collected all the free apps classified as “Top” (i.e., most popular) in each category
of the Google Play Store. These apps were downloaded in February 2017. Additionally,
we added apps preinstalled on a Nexus 5X device running Android 7. In total, we created
a dataset of 30,459 apps. Among these apps, 501 (1.64%) declare the USE FINGERPRINT
permission and, therefore, can potentially use the fingerprint API. In the rest of this
section, we will focus on this subset of 501 apps.
4.7.3 Apps Classification
Table 4.3 summarizes the outputs of our tool. We ran our tool in a private cloud, and
for the analysis of each app we provided 4 virtual-cores, 16 GB of RAM and 1 hour time
limit. For the 501 apps, our tool needed on average 354 seconds (σ = 363) of computation
and used 6.13 GB (σ = 1.07) of RAM per app. In 5 cases (1.00%), our analysis did not
finished due to bugs in the SOOT framework or analysis timeout.
For 72 (14.37%) apps, although they ask for the USE FINGERPRINT permission, our tool
did not detect any usage of the fingerprint API. This result is not particularly surprising
since previous research has shown that apps tend to require more permissions than they
use [84]. To further verify this finding, we manually analyzed a random sample of 10 of
these apps. We both manually run them and perform tool-assisted reverse engineering.
For 7 of them, we could confirm that they do not use the fingerprint API, whereas for
the other 3 our tool was unable to detect its usage because these apps use native code
components to activate the fingerprint reader sensor, which our tool is unable to analyze.
For apps classified as Weak we took a random sample of 20 apps among those in
which we were able to dynamically reach the fingerprint interface. Our dynamic analysis
confirmed that they were all correctly classified (i.e., our simulated attack in Section 4.7.1
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is successful). Among these 20 apps, 16 access a remote account or store secret data,
therefore a Weak usage of the fingerprint API is not appropriate (as explained in Sec-
tion 4.5.1).
For apps classified as Decryption we took a random sample of 10 apps and we con-
firmed that 9 were correctly classified (using, again, the simulated attack explained in
Section 4.7.1), whereas 1 was classified as Decryption while in reality is Weak .
Finally, about the 9 apps classified as Sign, we were able to dynamically reach the
fingerprint interface in one app and dynamic analysis confirmed the classification of this
app as correct. This app, called “True Key,” requires to sign an authentication token
during login and performs this operation with a TEE-protected private key, “unlocked”
only when the user touches the fingerprint reader sensor. To have a better evaluation,
we also extensively reverse engineer the other 8 samples classified as Sign. Our man-
ual analysis revealed that 7 of them have been classified correctly, whereas 1 has been
classified as Sign while being Decryption.
In summary, we manually analyzed (either by reproducing our attacks as explained
in Section 4.7.1 or by reverse engineering) 39 apps and we found that all the apps except
2 were classified correctly. In one case the misclassification is due to overapproximations
in the call graph. In the other, the app “signs” some data, but this data is constant,
since it is provided by the backend when the user logins the first time. For this reason,
the app falls into the Decryption category. In fact, an attacker can trivially replay the
result of this signing operation after it happened once. However, our tool was unable to
detect this scenario and, therefore, it classified the app as Sign.
Overall, results show how our tool is reasonably accurate in determining how an app
uses the fingerprint API. Moreover, the few misclassifications “overestimate” the security
of an app (classifying it as using the fingerprint API in a stronger way than in reality).
Therefore, we believe that our results, showing a low usage of the fingerprint API in the
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Sign way and a high usage in the Weak way, are particularly worrisome and confirm our
intuition that apps generally do not use appropriately the fingerprint API. In the next
sections, we will provide concrete examples of these inappropriate usages.
4.7.4 Case Study: Unlocking “Unlocked” Keys
As explained in Section 4.1.3, a key is stored inside the TEE and “unlocked” by a
fingerprint touch only if the setUserAuthenticationRequired method is invoked (by
passing true for its required parameter) when the key is generated. On the contrary,
without calling this method, a generated key is always “unlocked,” regardless of the usage
of the fingerprint API.
Surprisingly, we found this aspect as a source of implementation errors. In par-
ticular, we looked for apps implementing proper cryptographic operations as a conse-
quence of the user touching the fingerprint sensor (i.e., calling the authenticate API
to “unlock” a key used to decrypt or sign some data), but not calling properly the
setUserAuthenticationRequired method. This indicates that the developers wanted
to have a key “unlocked” when the legitimate user touches the fingerprint sensor, but
forgot to “lock” the key in the first place.
To identify these apps, we checked for apps that
1. are classified as Weak by our tool;
2. do not call the setUserAuthenticationRequired method (or they call it specifying
false as its parameter);
3. if they had called the setUserAuthenticationRequired method properly they
would have been classified as Decryption or Sign.
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Our tool identified 15 apps in this scenario and we were able to fully dynamically interact
with 4 of them, verifying their improper usage of the fingerprint API.
As an example, one of these applications allows a user to purchase items in an online
marketplace and requires the user to touch the fingerprint sensor during the checkout
procedure. The user’s password is stored encrypted by a supposedly TEE-secured key,
as is common when the fingerprint API is used in a Decryption way. During the check-
out, when the user touches the fingerprint sensor, this key is used to decrypt the user’s
password. However, we verified that the decryption key is not really “locked” since
the setUserAuthenticationRequired method is not called. Therefore, from a crypto-
graphic perspective, the use of the fingerprint API is useless. As a consequence, a root
attacker can easily bypass its usage.
4.7.5 Case Study: Google Play Store
Among the apps our tool classified as Weak , one is the “Google Play Store” app.
This app is present on every Google-branded phone, and it handles the purchase of
apps, media, and in-app purchases and can be setup to “protect” these purchases by a
fingerprint touch. In this case, the user would be required to touch the sensor before
every purchase. Since this app can directly spend user’s money and interacts with a
remote server, the most appropriate usage of the fingerprint API would be Sign, as also
stated and exemplified in the guidelines from Google itself.
However, our tool classified the Google Play Store app as using the fingerprint API in
a Weak way and our evaluation (as described in Section 4.7.1) confirmed this result. In
fact, this app calls the authenticate API with a NULL value for its crypto parameter,
and, therefore, no key is “unlocked” and no sign operation certifies that the purchase
happened as a consequence of the user touching the fingerprint reader sensor.
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On July 2017, we contacted the Android’s security team. The team promptly replied
and forwarded our report to the Google Play’s team, which is now aware of the issue and
investigating it.
4.7.6 Case Study: Square Cash
Among the apps our tool classified as Decryption, one is the “Square Cash” app.
This app is a personal payment app, which allows users to transfer money to and from
connected debit cards and bank accounts.
The app can be configured to require the user to touch the fingerprint sensor before
any transaction. The most appropriate usage of the fingerprint API in this case would be
to use it to sign these transactions. However, Whorlwind, the open source library that
Square (and other apps in our dataset) uses to implement the fingerprint functionality,
implements a weaker scheme. In particular, this library is used to decrypt a locally stored
authentication token. For this reason, by simulating an attacker with Root capabilities,
we were able to reuse the same decrypted token to perform different payments.
We contacted the developers of the Whorlwind library in August 2017, detailing our
findings and why we think that a Sign usage of the fingerprint API is more appropriate
in this case.
4.7.7 Case Study: Key Attestation
We mentioned in Section 4.4.4 that, starting from Android 7, a new mechanism
has been implemented to allow developers to “attest” public keys, ensuring they
have been generated from “trusted” TEEs. According to the API, a properly ver-
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ified certificate chain, “rooted at a trustworthy CA key,” is only provided if the
setAttestationChallenge API, with a non-NULL value for attestationChallenge, is
called.
Conceptually, apps using both the fingerprint API in a Sign way and key attestation
should be categorized in a different group in Table 4.3. However, in our dataset, our tool
found no app calling this API. This indicates that every app in our dataset is vulnerable
to a Root-at-Bootstrap attacker, who can interfere with the initial key exchange process
between the app and its remote backend.
4.8 Fingerprint API Improvements
We will now propose some changes to the current fingerprint API, which would signif-
icantly improve its security. In this section, we will assume that apps use the fingerprint
API in a Sign way, which, as previously shown in Section 4.4, it is the right way to
provide stronger security. However, even with proper usage, this API currently has some
shortcomings, which we will address here.
4.8.1 Trusted-UI
The biggest limitations of the current API and its implementation are:
1. Users have no trusted way to understand what they are signing by touching the
fingerprint sensor.
2. A malicious application (with or without “root” privileges) can interfere with what
is shown to the user when asked to touch the sensor.
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To solve both issues, we propose a mechanism in which the TEE can directly show to
the user the content of a sign operation performed by a fingerprint-unlocked key. This
mechanism is based on the known idea of having a trusted video path directly between
the TEE and the device’s screen. TEE-enforced video paths are already implemented
in some Android devices (for DRM purposes) [85] and academia explored its use for
authentication purposes [86]. However, differently from previous solutions, what we
propose is also based on a trusted input which is the fingerprint reader sensor, able to
directly communicate with the TEE.
We propose to change the current authenticate method to also take as an input a
message string parameter, for instance “Do you want to authorize a payment of $1,000
to Friend?” This message would be shown on a TEE-enforced Secure UI dialog window,
alongside with a standardized graphic UI asking the user to touch the fingerprint sensor.
Untrusted code, outside the TEE, cannot interfere with the visualization of this window,
due to the usage of a secure video path. Specifically, untrusted code cannot read the
content of this dialog window nor modify it.
When the sensor is touched by a legitimate user, a signature of this string (generated
using the private key “unlocked,” specified when the authenticate method is called) is
available using a method called getSignedMessage. The remote backend can then verify
that this message has been signed correctly and, therefore, be sure of what the user has
authorized by touching the sensor. In other words, the remote backend can verify the
“user intention,” which is signed by the TEE.
The security of this system is guaranteed by the fact that both the code for handling
the sign operation and the code for visualizing the message are within the TEE. Therefore,
an attacker, even having root privileges, cannot decouple what is being shown to the user
with what is being signed by the fingerprint-unlocked key. An attacker can still interfere
with the communication between the backend, the app, and the TEE. However, this will
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be detectable by the user. In fact, suppose that the attacker changes the request the
app sends to the backend from “Pay Friend $1,000” to “Pay Attacker $1,000.” As a
consequence the backend will send the following message to be signed by the TEE: “Do
you want to authorize a payment of $1,000 to Attacker?”. In this case, the user will be
able to notice that the message does not correspond to her intention.
Another issue is how to prevent an attacker from showing a malicious dialog window
that resembles the window shown by the TEE when asking the user to touch the finger-
print sensor. Without requiring extra hardware (e.g., an LED would be turned on when
“secure output” is displayed), we can exploit the fingerprint sensor itself to mitigate this
attack. Since the fingerprint sensor can communicate directly and exclusively with the
TEE, we propose that the TEE shows a hard-to-spoof visual clue (e.g., a loading bar)
while the user touches the sensor.
Attackers would be unable to show this bar at the right time, since, outside the
TEE, it is unknown when the user touched the sensor. Therefore, the absence (or the
improper behavior) of this visual element would indicate to the user that the shown
dialog window is not legitimate. Another possible solution, although less practical since
it requires a setup phase, would be to use a secret (i.e., only know by the user and the
TEE) personalized security indicator. This mechanism has been shown as an effective
defensive mechanism in the Android ecosystem [1].
It is important to notice, however, that even without this defense, an attacker would
not be able to lure users to sign a malicious transaction, but only to pretend that a
transaction happened.
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4.8.2 Other UI Changes
While a solution based on hardware-enforced secure-UI is the best way to address
current API shortcomings, we understand that its adoption and deployment may be
problematic because it requires non-trivial modifications to the code running inside the
TEE and the coordination between this code, the Android operating system, and the
display hardware. Therefore, we also propose easier-to-implement modifications to the
current Android user-level framework. While attackers having “root” privileges can triv-
ially bypass these mechanisms, they are still effective against a non-root attacker.
In particular, Android should automatically dismiss overlay windows on top of in-
terfaces asking the user to touch the fingerprint sensor. A similar solution is already
applied in the latest Android versions to protect “security sensitive” interfaces, such as
the one used to grant/remove apps’ permissions. In addition, the name (and the icon) of
the app asking the user’s touch should be clearly shown. To implement both solutions,
a standard interface, which apps cannot modify except showing some text on it, should
be shown when the authenticate API is called. In the current implementation, custom
interfaces are possible, but uncommon. In fact, most of the apps show very similar inter-
faces (Android guidelines precisely define how this dialog should appear [87]), thus they
will not need to significantly change their UI.
4.8.3 Better Attestation Mechanisms
As we previously mentioned, a key attestation mechanism has been implemented,
starting from Android 7. However, in its current implementation state, this mechanism
has several weaknesses.
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First of all, the API defines two possible “levels” for the attestation “software” and
“hardware,” where only the latter guarantees that a key has been generated by the de-
vice’s TEE. The level of attestation can be retrieved by parsing the attestation certificate
associated with a generated public key. However, in the devices we have tried (Nexus 5X
and Pixel XL, running Android 7), the generated keys are always “software” attested.
More fundamentally, while analyzing the generated certificates, we did not find any
indication of the specific instance of the device generating a key. As also pointed out by
the paper presenting the Security Key protocol [58], there is a trade-off between user’s
privacy and security of the protocol. Having a system that can identify the specific
device generating a key would allow remote backends to detect suspicious situations in
which the key associated with a specific user changes. Moreover, it would hinder the
ability of an attacker to “proxy” key creation to an attacker-controlled TEE, since too
many keys (used by many different users) generated by the same device would be easily
detected as suspicious. However, this would violate user’s privacy, allowing unique user’s
identification among different apps. Therefore, we recommend, as in the Security Key
protocol, the implementation of a batch attestation scheme, in which a set of devices,
using the same hardware (and potentially affected by the same security issues), shares
the same attestation key.
Finally, we note that the current documentation about how to verify key attestation
certificates is insufficient and the only official sample code [88] does not cover all the
possible cases that need to be handled while parsing this type of certificates.
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4.9 Limitations and Future Work
This work focuses on the most common fingerprint API in Android, used by Google’s
devices. However, Samsung’s and Huawei’s devices offer their custom fingerprint hard-
ware and a different API. Moreover, outside of the Android ecosystem, similar systems
are offered on Apple’s devices [89, 90]. Studying similarities and differences among these
APIs and how apps that want to be compatible with multiple devices handle this frag-
mentation is the main future direction of this work.
Our static analysis is based on call graph generation and data-flow graph analysis.
This approach has been proved effective by previous research [91] in determining how
specific APIs are used in Android. However, this approach is unable to analyze reflective
code, dynamically loaded, or native components. Regarding the first two aspects, we do
not expect them to be a significant source of imprecision when analyzing non-malicious
code and we did not find any sample misclassified because of these reasons. We consider
the analysis of components written in native code outside the scope of this chapter.
Empirically, we found that the usage of native code prevented us from analyzing three
apps (among those manually verified), as explained in Section 4.7.3.
More fundamentally, the implemented static analysis can indicate the way in which
an app uses locally the fingerprint API, but it cannot fully evaluate how this aspect
affects the overall authentication mechanism implemented by the app and its backend.
This analysis usually requires probing the remote backend (when, as it is typically, the
backend’s code is not available) to determine if it properly checks user’s authentication.
Merging our tool with more general remote protocol analyzers (as, for instance, the one
proposed by Zuo et al. [92]) represents another interesting future direction.
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4.10 Conclusions
This work provides the first systematic study on the usage of the fingerprint API
in Android. We show that its usage is not well understood and often misused by apps’
developers. In particular, our study shows that several apps, including popular ones such
as Google Play Store and Square Cash, do not use this API in the most secure way. We
believe that the fingerprint API could significantly improve the security and the usability
of existing authentication and authorizations schemes, especially because the hardware it
needs is commonly available in modern mobile devices. We hope this work will highlight
current weaknesses and push Google to provide better documentation and to address the
remaining problematic issues.
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Related Work
5.1 Attacks to Mobile User-Interfaces
As mentioned in the introduction of Chapter 2, previous papers have already shed
some light on the problem of GUI confusion attacks in Android. In particular, [6] de-
scribes tapjacking attacks in general, whereas [7] focuses on tapjacking attacks against
WebViews (graphical elements used in Android to display Web content). Felt et al. [8]
focus on phishing attacks on mobile devices deriving from control transfers (compara-
ble to the “App Switching” attacks we described), whereas Chen et al. [9] describe a
technique to infer the UI state from an unprivileged app and present attack examples.
Our work generalizes these previously-discovered techniques by systematizing existing
exploits and introducing additional attack vectors. We also confirmed the effectiveness
of these attacks through a user study. More importantly, we additionally proposed two
general defense mechanisms and evaluated their effectiveness.
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Fernandes et al. present a GUI defense focusing on keyboard input in [12]: the “Au-
thAuth” system augments the system keyboard by presenting a user-defined image and
the app name and icon. Our proposed defense system uses the same “UI-user shared
secret” mechanism: in both cases, users must first choose an image that will be known
only by the OS and the user, making it unspoofable for an attacking app.
However, our works significantly differ in how this mechanism is used and what is
presented to the user. For instance, as we have shown before (e.g., see Figure 2.4),
app names and icons are not valid or reliable roots of trust, as they are easy to spoof.
Apps with similar-looking names and icons are commonly present in Android markets,
and fake apps with the same name and icon can be side-loaded on the device. Our work,
instead, establishes a root of trust to the author of the app and extends the covered attack
surface by considering more attack scenarios and methods. In particular, we opted to
secure all the user interactions instead of focusing only on the keyboard, because users
interact with apps in a variety of ways. For instance, some payment apps (e.g., Google
Wallet) use custom PIN-entry forms, while others get sensitive input such as health-
related information through multiple-choice buttons or other touch-friendly methods.
Roesner et al. [93] studied the problem of embedded user interfaces in Android and
its security implications. Specifically, they focus on the common practice of embedding
in an app’s graphical elements, created by included libraries. The problem they solve is
related and complementary to the one we focus on. Specifically, they focus on how users
interact with different elements within the same app, whereas we focus on how users
interact with different apps.
Felt et al. performed a usability study to evaluate how users understand permission
information shown during the installation process of an app [94]. They showed that cur-
rent permission warnings are not helpful for most users and presented recommendations
for improving user attention. Possible modifications to how permissions are displayed to
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users and enforced have also been studied in Aurasium [95]. Our work has in common
with these the fact that it proposes a set of modifications to give users more information
on the current status of the system, although we address a different threat.
Many studies investigated how to show security-related information and error mes-
sages in browsers, both from a general prospective [96, 97, 98] and specifically for
HTTPS [99, 100, 101, 102, 103]. Akhawe et al. [103] showed that proper HTTPS se-
curity warning messages are effective in preventing users from interacting with malicious
websites. The knowledge presented by these works has been used as a baseline for our
proposed defense mechanism. It should be noted, however, that other studies have shown
that indicators are not always effective. In fact, over the years, the situation has signif-
icantly improved in browsers: compare, for instance, the almost-hidden yellow lock on
the status bar of Internet Explorer 6 from [102] with Figure 2.1. We believe that our
solution may also have benefited from the EV-style presentation of a name in addition to
a lock and the consequent increase in screen area. In general, effectively communicating
the full security status of user interactions is an open problem.
Phishing protection has been extensively studied in a web browser context (e.g.,
in [104, 105, 106]) and is commonly implemented using, for example, blacklists such
as Google’s SafeBrowsing [107]. Our work is complementary to these approaches and
explores GUI confusion attacks that are not possible in web browsers.
In addition, the problem of presenting a trustworthy GUI has been studied and im-
plemented in desktop operating systems, either by using a special key combination [108]
or decorations around windows [109]. Given the limited amount of screen space and con-
trols, applying these solutions in mobile devices would be impossible in an unobtrusive
way.
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Zhang et al. [79] show how UI attacks were extremely easy in Samsung devices (Sam-
sung Galaxy S5 and S6) running Android 5. Specifically, these attacks were possible
because, after a legitimate user touched the fingerprint reader sensor, a malicious app
could use fingerprint-protected cryptographic keys generated by other apps. In addition,
they show how in some devices it was possible to steal raw fingerprint information. In
the work presented in Chapter 4, we focus primarily on the newer Google’s fingerprint
API (released with Android 6), in which each app utilizes app-specific keys.
Finally, a recent work shows how redressing attacks can even lead to complete com-
promise of the device UI [75], since an app can use these attacks to stealthy obtain
“accessibility” permission and take full control of the user’s input and the display’s out-
put.
5.2 Authentication-Related Vulnerabilities in Mo-
bile Devices
Zhang et al. explore the issue of uninstallation residue, where uninstalling an app
does not correctly clean up all data and references in the system, creating an opportunity
for an attacker to elevate their privileges and steal sensitive information [110]. While
the detection system we explained in Chapter 3 uses uninstallation of apps to trigger
a removal of app-private data, the vulnerabilities targeted in this work and ours are
very different. In fact, the system we described in Section 3.3 detects authentication
vulnerabilities that involve the usage of both device identifiers and files in public locations.
The paper entitled Mayhem in the Push Clouds [111] explores the related issue of push
messaging platforms, which are commonly used by apps to communicate asynchronously
with their backends. The paper found that authentication tokens for these services are
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often handled insecurely, especially when sent using Android’s Intents. Our work focuses
on what can happen when these tokens are created using device-public information, or
are in turn stored as device-public information.
Chen et al., in OAuth Demystified for Mobile Application Developers [112], explore
the usage of OAuth-like mechanisms for authentication. Their work included a manual
study of 149 applications using OAuth and found that 89 used it incorrectly. Moreover,
Wang et al. investigate OAuth misuse from a different angle in their paper Explicating
SDKs [113], which examines the way applications use authentication and authorization
SDKs from companies such as Facebook and Microsoft. A related, but distinct, vul-
nerability can occur in improperly implemented services using OAuth, which implicitly
trust responses from identity providers without verification [114]. In contrast to web
platforms, in mobile apps, these responses originate from the user being authenticated,
meaning they can be tampered with, allowing an attacker to authenticate as the victim
without their private credentials.
As we do in our work, Liu et al. [115] studies how apps unsafely use public storage.
However, their work focuses on how the public storage is used to store sensitive informa-
tion (such as the user’s contact list), whereas we focus on how the public storage is used
to store information that, together with device’s identifiers, is used to authenticate with
remote backends. Similarly, a work by Bai et al. [116] studies how a specific class of apps
(backup tools) leaks information in publicly accessible files in the external storage. How-
ever, the apps studied by this work require either root or shell privileges, not obtainable
by normal apps under the threat model we considered in Chapter 3 (non-compromised
operating system).
Zuo et al. [92] developed a system, named AutoForge, to automatically find au-
thentication vulnerabilities revolving around user-private information. Specifically, they
focused on detecting apps’ backends vulnerable to password brute-forcing, leaked user-
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name and password probing, and Facebook access-token hijacking. We consider this
work as complementary to ours. In fact, their work studies how apps’ backend behaves
when probed with supposedly-secret data, such as usernames, passwords, and Facebook
authentication tokens. Conversely, our work focuses on an entire class of authentication
schemes that do not rely on this supposedly-secret data.
A paper by Mulliner et al. [50] looks directly at the issue of SMS-based one-time
passwords. They explore various layers of the problem, including issues of wireless in-
terception, and smartphone Trojans, similar to our “ID Leaker.” While their work was
primarily motivated by the use of mobile Transaction Authorization Numbers in the
banking industry, this same idea has also spread to most areas of the mobile world that
require verification of a user’s phone number, as we explore in our study. SMS authenti-
cation is further investigated by Schrittwieser et al. [117]. In this work, authors manually
analyze a selection of messaging apps, verifying their security properties and finding
different vulnerabilities in them.
The intrinsic weakness of SMS-based authentication has been recently pointed out.
For instance, security researchers have shown that, by exploiting vulnerabilities of the
SS7 network used by telecom company to route phone calls and SMS, it is possible
for an attacker to intercept SMS and steal authentication codes [118]. Moreover, state-
sponsored attackers could easily interfere with local telecom companies to intercept these
authentication messages [70]. For this reason, the latest security guidelines advise against
the use of SMS as a two-factor authentication method [119]. It is important to notice
that the vulnerabilities we found in popular messaging apps (see Section 3.5.1) were not
due to the usage of SMS content for authentication, but a consequence of the usage of
publicly accessible files and device’s identifiers to authenticate their users.
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A few other works focus on aspects concerning the security of the fingerprint hard-
ware sensor and the storage of fingerprint data [120, 121]. In the work presented in
Chapter 4 we expand and generalize findings of these previous works and, in addition,
we systematically study how apps use the fingerprint API and how this aspect affects
the overall security of an app’s authentication scheme.
There is a number of works related to two-factor authentication and authentication
in mobile systems. Lang et al. [58] describe “Security Keys,” second-factor devices that
protect users against phishing and man-in-the-middle attacks. They also discuss the
deployment of this technology to the Chrome browser and Google online services. In our
work, we show how the fingerprint API could potentially offer the same or better security
properties, but some shortcomings in its implementation and in how apps use it prevent
this from happening.
One-Time Passwords (OTPs) are a (weaker) alternative to Security Keys.
TrustOTP [86] shows how smartphones can act as secure OTP tokens. Dmitrienko
et al. [68] highlight weaknesses in the design and adoption of two-factor authentica-
tion protocols and mechanisms. In particular, they show how an attacker can mount
cross-device attacks and bypass 2FA mechanisms such as SMS-based TANs (Transaction
Authentication Numbers) used by banks, or login verification systems such as Google,
Twitter, and Facebook. Chen et al. [122] discuss different OAuth implementations and
their adoption by mobile applications.
5.3 Automated Analysis of Mobile Applications
Rastogi et al. proposed AppsPlayground [41], a dynamic analysis framework aimed
at maximizing code coverage of dynamic analysis. Other works with similar goals are
Brahmastra by Bhoraskar et al. [123] and DynoDroid by Machiry et al. [124]. The vul-
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nerability detection system described in Chapter 3 utilizes similar techniques to interact
with apps, however, our goal is different, since we do not aim to maximize code coverage
but to trigger the authentication mechanisms in a deterministic manner.
Different tools have been proposed to deterministically record and playback input
events on Android: RERAN [125], MOSAIC [126], MobiPlay [127], and VALERA [128].
The usage of these tools as a part of our dynamic-analysis based vulnerability detec-
tion system constitutes an interesting future direction, since they could remove non-
deterministic behaviors which currently hinder our analysis. However, in their current
state, these tools do not completely solve the problem. For instance, RERAN, MOSAIC,
and MobiPlay do not deterministically replay network traffic, whereas in our experiments
we determined that most of the non-deterministic behaviors are due to discrepancies or
delays in the network traffic between an app and its backend. The approach of VALERA
can deal with network traffic, however, it cannot replay user’s interaction in case of ap-
plications using customized rendering, like many of the ones we detected as vulnerable
(see Section 3.5.2). Unfortunately, most of the apps we correctly detected as vulnerable
actually use customized interfaces and heavily interact with online backends.
Several works focus on the automatic detection of classes of vulnerabilities in Android
apps. Previous work focused on detecting over-privileged apps [129], component-hijacking
vulnerabilities [130], vulnerable content providers [131], permission leaking [132], and
vulnerabilities related to the unsafe usage of crypto-related APIs [91, 92], SSL connec-
tions [133], and dynamic code loading [134]. Other recent works show how some apps
implement vulnerable custom authentication schemes (trying to minimize users’ effort
during login) [2] and how apps often use payment libraries insecurely [135]. Acar et al.
provide an overview of the different security mechanisms implemented in Android and
the improvements suggested by academia [136].
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Conclusions and Future Directions
In this thesis, I presented my studies on the current mobile ecosystem, how its components
trust each other, and how an attacker can exploit these trust relationships.
It is important to notice that during my studies, some countermeasures to the
identified security issues have been implemented in Android, in some cases with so-
lutions similar to what we proposed. For instance, the behavior of the Android UI
has been significantly changed over the years, progressively constraining how an app
can control the device’s UI, and giving more possibility to the user to limit app’s
capabilities.[137, 138, 139, 140]
More fundamentally, newer Android versions include mechanisms to ensure that an
attacker cannot hinder user authentication, even when the standard, untrusted, operating
system has been compromised. These recent additions constitute a radical change in the
trust relationships between apps, remote backends, the operating system, and Trusted
Execution Environments. We discussed some of these mechanisms in Chapter 4, but
others have been proposed, and some of them will be implemented in the upcoming
Android version (“Android P”)[141, 142]. For instance, a secure UI mechanism, similar
to what proposed in Section 4.8.1, will be available in this upcoming version.
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While these new security mechanisms undoubtedly improve the security of the An-
droid operating system, at this stage, it is unclear how devices’ manufacturers will im-
plement them and if apps’ developers will use them correctly. Therefore, the primary
future direction of this work will be to study if and how these mechanisms will be used,
identifying common developers’ mistakes and proposing modifications to the APIs used
to control them, to ease their adoption.
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